

JPRS 75193

25 February 1980

Latin America Report

No. 2114



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 75193	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle LATIN AMERICA REPORT, No. 2114		5. Report Date 25 February 1980		
6.				
7. Author(s)		8. Performing Organization Rept. No.		
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201		10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.		
11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)				
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above		13. Type of Report & Period Covered		
14.				
15. Supplementary Notes				
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) The serial report contains articles on political and sociological developments in major areas of Latin America, as reported primarily from Latin American newspapers and periodicals. It also includes information on major segments of Latin American economy, geography, culture, and ethnography.				
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors				
Political Science	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Inter-American Affairs		<input type="checkbox"/> Haiti	
Sociology	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Argentina		<input type="checkbox"/> Honduras	
Economics	<input type="checkbox"/> Barbados		<input type="checkbox"/> Jamaica	
Culture	<input type="checkbox"/> Bolivia		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mexico	
Ethnology	<input type="checkbox"/> Brazil		<input type="checkbox"/> Netherlands	
Technological	<input type="checkbox"/> Chile		<input type="checkbox"/> Antilles	
Geography	<input type="checkbox"/> Colombia		<input type="checkbox"/> Nicaragua	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Costa Rica		<input type="checkbox"/> Panama	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cuba		<input type="checkbox"/> Paraguay	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Dominican Republic		<input type="checkbox"/> Peru	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Ecuador		<input type="checkbox"/> Trinidad-Tobago	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> El Salvador		<input type="checkbox"/> Uruguay	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Guatemala		<input type="checkbox"/> Venezuela	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Guyana			
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 5D, 5C, 5K				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 83	
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price	

(See ANSI-Z39.18)

OPTIONAL FORM 272 (4-77)
 (Formerly NTIS-35)
 Department of Commerce

25 February 1980

LATIN AMERICA REPORT

No. 2114

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CUBA'S DECLINING INFLUENCE COMMENTED ON BY COLOMBIAN MAGAZINE

Guatemala City EL IMPARCIAL in Spanish 2 Feb 80 p 3

[Text] Bogota--USICA--The preeminent position Cuba maintained for "two decades" has begun to change substantially in recent weeks, according to the Colombian magazine GUION.

In an article titled "Cuba of Exile and Cuba in Exile," the weekly, which is managed by former president Misael Pastrana, says:

It was logical to think that if the nonaligned nations had fully given her (Cuba) their trust in the Havana meeting, they would also give Cuba their support so that for the first time Cuba would obtain a seat in the Security Council. It was also, it appears, a strategy coordinated with the Soviet Union. Now it comes out that the communist superpower had been planning its blow against Afghanistan for some time and for this adventure it counted on Cuba presiding over the Security Council, as would have happened statutorily if it had been selected...

After the invasion of Afghanistan, the flight of the nonaligned countries began and Cuba suffered its first reverse in the many years of existence of the international organization. Castro was faced with the dilemma of maintaining the role of representative of the nonaligned or of accepting the defeat of his hopes for becoming a member of the United Nations body and with undeniable realism, he opted for the second choice. The peace of Rhodesia diminished his capability for interference in African affairs. And, finally, the poor sugarcane harvest, with its natural distortions of the entire economy, was added to his troubles.

These accumulated international events and growing domestic unrest forced Castro to the reorganization of his government, which many believe can very well be the beginning of the end. With respect to the worsening of domestic problems, it is possible that the decision by the chief of state to facilitate trips by refugees in the United States to his country may have in large measure contributed to it. More than 100,000 Cubans in exile went to Havana last year to visit relatives or out of curiosity to learn the results of the prolonged Marxist experiment.

The results could not be more disappointing for the Cuban government. The majority of the travelers returned, cutting from their spirit all the bonds, which like a memory joined them to their motherland, filled with the determination of never returning...Strangely, there is not a single one up to now who has been moved by nostalgia to return and take up his life there once more.

Freedom, after all, is a concept which is valued more when it has been lost, and these short trips have particularly allowed them to see the contrast, to see what it is like when darkness persists. More than 800,000 Cubans, that is, 10 percent of the population of the land of Marti, have escaped from their land in search of the dream of freedom.

...It is worth noting that few immigrant communities have contributed with so much vigor to the progress of North America, whose national makeup after all is a melting pot of different races such as the Cuban.

For 20 years, consciously or subconsciously, each Cuban in exile felt that his absence was temporary, that every step taken was oriented toward his return. They were citizens in passage through a temporarily enjoyed land.

Coming into contact with the new Cuban reality, they suddenly understood that the country in which they had been born had changed, and on returning to their neighborhoods of "Little Havana" in Miami, they understood in turn that this was their real country...

Once more the flight in boats (from Cuba) has begun, a desperate means of escape from the guarded isle. And discontent has been reborn among the young generations, who had only heard the truth from the lips of their leaders and now they heard a diametrically opposed version from the lips of others...moreover, the frozen bodies and spirits of the Cubans have been reborn after making contact with fresh air...

We are in the presence of two Cubas: The Cuba of exile without one's own country, but with a homeland, if this means a similarity of ideals; and the Cuba in exile with one's own country but without a homeland for many of them because it has become an alien land.

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ARGENTINA

PARTIES, OFFICIALS PREPARE FOR POLITICAL DIALOG

Speculation on Possible Participants

Buenos Aires CONFIRMADO in Spanish 24 Jan 80 pp 4-5

[Text] In March, when the "political period" officially begins, the public's attention will be focused on the personage of the interior minister, Div Gen Albano Eduardo Harguindeguy, for reasons of his own influence. This fact will, for the first time in 4 years, cause the focal point of the government's activity to be concentrated on a non-economic area, which has unquestionably been a kind of "star" since 24 March 1976.

But, in fact, we need not wait another few weeks to become apprised of the first studies of the advisers in the political ministry. Indeed, as has already been publicly disclosed, the authorities are fully involved in preparing the lists of individuals who will be invited to participate in the dialog with General Harguindeguy.

The unknown quantity at present is the names which the government considers to be those of persons suitable for initiating the talks. The main question relates to the attitude that will be assumed toward the first vice-president of the Justicialist Party, Deolindo Felipe Bittel. It must be recalled that the Chaco court clerk's confrontation with the present military process caused a crisis in September 1979, when he issued a critical document which coincided with the visit made by the OAS' Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

Meanwhile, others are wondering whether the leaders of the Argentine Communist Party, whose principles still adhere unequivocally to the dictates of the Kremlin, will be invited to the conference table.

What is certain is that, in addition to the effort being made by the political adviser to the presidency, the Mendoza democrat, Francisco Moyano, has already begun to feel the influence in government circles of two new members of the Ministry of Interior: Miguel Angel Iribarne and Adalberto Barboza. Both cabinet collaborators originate in the area of right wing Catholic nationalism.

Although nothing has been learned from the cliques at the Casa Rosada, Angel Federico Robledo and the neuro-surgeon, Raul Floreal Matera, are considered by the Peronists to be "numbers included" on the lists for the talks. Also taken for granted is the participation of the former ambassador to Portugal, Americo Ghioaldi, and the former minister of social welfare and president of the Federal Party, Guillermo Manrique.

Something odd has occurred lately with the Development Movement. It was learned from a press report that the leaders of the MID [Integration and Development Movement] would not be willing to hold a dialog so long as the economic policy being carried out by Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz is in effect. When queried by CONFIRMADO, sources associated with Rogelio Fri-gerio expressed their "surprise, because MID never intended to exclude itself. Furthermore, we are always ready for dialog; and, in addition, we demand to be heeded seriously, so that our comments will not fall into a void."

But the expectations will start to be fulfilled after the forthcoming governors' meeting convoked for March in Buenos Aires by the minister of interior. At that time, we shall learn the new guidelines for political action that the central authority wants to impose, both for the provincial area and for the municipalities.

Meanwhile, the attitude of the leading political parties, the Radicals and the Peronists, is still one of expectation, accompanied by an analysis of the immediate strategies to be pursued with respect to the government.

The Difficult Foreign Relations

Apart from Argentina's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, the country carefully monitored the visit to Chile made by the commander-in-chief of the Argentine Air Force, Brig Gen Omar Graffigna, during which he met with his Chilean counterpart, Air Gen Fernando Matthei. Without doubt, the most important topic that they discussed was that of the Beagle. In this regard, the Argentine military leader declared: "We are seeking points of agreement which will also contribute to the progress of the papal mediation." Other matters were also reportedly considered, such as the often-mentioned establishment of a Southern Cone Pact (between Uruguay, Chile, Argentina and Paraguay), and the evaluation of the political situation on this part of the continent. The possibility that both commanders may have discussed the pressure that the United States has been wielding against Buenos Aires and Santiago was not precluded either.

On the other hand, at the San Martin Palace the efforts of the committee that is working on the preparation of a response to the preliminary report of the CIDH [Inter-American Human Rights Commission] are continuing. The four ambassadors engaged in the task are, therefore, attempting to reconcile the different positions that have been assumed by the various government sectors.

The Coming Months

There has also been a recent disclosure of statements made by the former commander-in-chief of the Army, Lt Gen (ret) Roberto Eduardo Viola, who declared that he had no desire whatsoever to be president of the republic, but that, if he were asked, he would have to accept the job. These observations are certainly more than premonitory and suggestive to anyone who wants to make political predictions.

Dilemma for Labor Leaders

Buenos Aires CONFIRMADO in Spanish 24 Jan 80 p 8

[Text] Two matters transcend the bounds of the trade unions' participation in the political debate. One is that, starting in March, the relationship between politics and trade unions will be updated, despite the government's specific ban in this regard with the recently passed Law on Workers Trade Union Associations.

By the end of February, if there are no postponements by the Ministry of Labor, the trade union "popes" will have decided on a "political act": the acceptance of Law 22,105, through the submission of the areas of activity.

Lisandro Zapata, former member of the secretariat of the Metal Workers Union, reportedly commented to other leaders of the union that "it is not politically expedient to turn over the structures;" and hence the political position should be regarded as that of submitting the areas of activity throughout the entire republic (which simply means accepting the law). The original position paper had the consent of Mario Barrientos (San Martin) and the small group of leaders who attended the unsuccessful conclave called by certain sectors of the aforementioned union on Friday, 18 January. On that occasion, the absence of the "popes," Alberto Campos and Luis Guerrero, as well as of many section leaders, was noted.

However, the matter is critical from a Peronist standpoint during the next few months. The dilemma for the trade unionists is whether the Peronist trade union entities will operate as part of the institutional structures, or whether, on the contrary, they will do so in systems of their own, such as the Peronist Trade Union Movement, or the 62 organizations. The latter notion appeals to those who think that the trade union movement should operate outside of the structures that the government recognizes.

The second point is the recurrence of the rumor concerning the possibility that the former secretary general of the Metal Workers Union, Lorenzo Miguel, who is receiving visits now and then from some political and trade union leaders during his house arrest, may be released at the end of February. Miguel's opinion would certainly be important in the determination

of the position to be assumed by the trade union structure toward the law, and as an integral part of the Justicialist movement.

The divisions in the MSP [Peronist Union Movement] and the crisis that the CUTA [Unified Leadership of Argentine Workers] is experiencing make it difficult to imagine a unanimous position among the union leaders on essential issues. At first (during the Peronist confinement), the CUTA relied on the harsh positions of the first vice-president of the Justicialist Party, Deolindo Felipe Bittel. But now that the union leaders may be about to accept the law, the situation could become reversed, and the hard line of the former Chaco governor could interfere with the trade unionists' maneuvers. Perhaps for this reason, the amenable Alberto Triacca is approaching the positions assumed by Manuel Anchorena and Angel Federico Robledo, who are advocates of civilian-military convergence.

The Strategic Differences

What is unquestionably at stake is the strategy to be pursued; and the trade unionists obviously appear to be aiming more at the long term than at the immediate future.

There is every indication that those who are now leading the entities will temporarily accept the law. Some have commented, for example, a Santa Fe UOM [Metal Workers Union] leader who chose to keep his name confidential: "If I agree to join the committee that must accept the statutes in order to federalize our union, it is because I am in agreement with the function." To others, without the importance of real leadership, the issue is a basis for opposition, and the dividing line ranges from the MSP to any opposition group which criticizes what in their opinion are the overly institutionalist positions of certain leaders. For this reason, certain groups, for example, the maroon-colored list of telephone workers formerly headed by Julio Guillan, the green list of railroad workers, and the white or maroon list of metal workers are beginning to reappear.

In any event, the divisions in the MSP could obstruct the necessary political unity that this sector would require to efficiently counter the legalistic onslaughts of the majority in the trade union structure.

And If the Factories Disappear?

While the period of speculation is under way, a reality is threatening the industrial unions. Sources linked with the metal workers made this claim in view of the closing of the Winco (electrical household appliances) factory, the similar Siam plant (Avellaneda) and the La Cantabrica factory (Moron).

At Siam Avellaneda, a percentage of the workers at the plant (270 workers) were transferred to Siat, owned by the same company. Meanwhile, the rest

of the personnel, numbering about 1,000 workers, were again laid off until 28 February. In the Siam plant there is no longer the section to which both Luis Guerrero, former secretary general of the Avellaneda section of the UOM, and its current head, Belen, belonged. A trade unionist philosophized that the status of the "job sources" could eventually "eliminate and purge more leaders than the law on unions itself."

Interior Minister's Key Role

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 20 Jan 80 p 8

[Text] There are political terms on which the current process has not conferred the pertinent transit certificate in the government offices and their environs, regardless of the fact that custom still attributes good use to them in Argentina. One of them had its prime at the beginning of the 1970's when the Argentine revolution was showing the first signs of crisis, and its weakened first president, Juan Carlos Onganía, entrusted the governorship of Neuquen to the local neo-Peronist leader, Felipe Sapag. By so doing, the heel of the national government suggested that the tendency toward excluding political personages (which had typified his administration up until then) was coming somewhat under control.

With this unique step taken by the president, something beleaguered by the pressures from his internal front, there occurred the first "pilot experiment" of a government the military elements of whose political backing did not share the obvious intention of the executive branch, directed more to corporative solution than to democratic institutionalization. That method for civilian participation, so aptly christened, was later more extensively used during the Levingston and Lanusse governments; and, in Mendoza, a democratic governor (Francisco Gabrieli) virtually incorporated his party into the provincial administration.

It could not be claimed today by anyone with a knowledge of the basic facts and common sense that the conditions fostering those methods for participation are in effect. In the first place, because they were arrived at in view of the undeferrable need of the Armed Forces to show the country their convictions, dissociated from those being perceived in the Casa Rosada by certain collaborators selected by Onganía. Secondly, the presence of a neo-Peronist in Neuquen, or a conservative in Mendoza, for example, was also based on another principle of that time, whereby nothing was more appropriate than to appeal to the "native governors," personages who, in La Pampa and Tucuman as well, were identified with the most representative political movements existing prior to 28 June 1966.

If the conditions are different, as one can readily note, and the major dialectical effort of the Armed Forces does not consist of proving their already demonstrated democratic persuasion, to talk today about "pilot experiments" in any province is without doubt an untimely gesture. And, as such, it causes irritation where one thinks that the guidelines for the

national process should be sufficiently clearcut among those who are analyzing the realpolitik.

The presidential adviser, Ambassador Francisco Moyano, did not have to be overly suspicious to assume that this "balloon" may have been attempting to cast a shadow over him, rather than convincing anyone that the Democratic Party would have to take over the provincial government, making a bridge of the new governor, Brig Gen Rolando Jose Ghisani; the latter being a possibility as remote as the certainty that the presumed ministerial candidates might have of it. Videla's own adviser had to explain to the most naive the many reasons which must immediately discredit such an impossible task as that of sectorizing the process in a province; in this case, his own, and with a party which is also his own, although in a state of suspension. It is obvious that a seasoned politician such as Mr Moyano must have felt perplexed at what anyone or someone might have thought of him, but this certainly did not include the minister of interior who, on Wednesday, guided the nominated governor in his initial critical steps. We need not expect innovations in these suggestions or guidelines.

The Political Minister

For nearly 4 years, it could only be faintly claimed that Gen Albano Harguindeguy has been the political minister; because his activity has been observed mainly in the provinces, and somewhat dissociated from the traditional image of the ministry of the parties and of politics. When fall arrives, that image of a military administrator will begin to vanish; and Harguindeguy, out of necessity (only events will prove whether out of desire), will make intensive use of the political reins of his department, because of and as a result of the bases that the executive branch must devise.

In the offices of the minister and also those of the General Secretariat of the Presidency, during the relative vacation of the head of government, the work has been redoubled to establish the up until now ambiguous details of the dialog. It may be claimed with accuracy and exactness that the head of the political ministry will be the official and de facto spokesman for the executive branch with its guests, even in the surely frequent instance wherein the participants - av wish to discuss other specific aspects of public affairs. Under these circumstances, Harguindeguy will summon to his conference table the heads of the different areas of the executive branch, without delegating his authority as top-ranking official representative.

This week, some inquisitive person asked how, for example, a meeting on that level could take place with Mr Rogelio Frigerio; and the answer served as a more general example: If the subject is economic, the minister could extend the invitation to his colleague in the Palace of Finance. But it so happens (and the comment serves as a response as well) that the leader of the Development Movement considers dialog on any issue impracticable so long as Martinez de Hoz is still directing the nation's economic affairs.

In such an instance, Frigerio would be one of those who would exclude himself, but those who think so are of the opinion that this would not preclude access to other members of the MID.

That example could serve to gage the complexity with which the governmental organizers of the dialog view their options. One of them, after the obvious explanation that the invitations from the Ministry of Interior will be personal and not partisan, confessed that the task of selection is almost overwhelming, after noting that his "ballpark figure" estimated the number of national and provincial parties with sufficient status not to be excluded at about 100. In this case, we cannot fail to consider what at least 45 of them might propose with respect to a draft statute which refuses electoral certification to more than a small number of parties, nor what the official criterion (regardless of how unavoidable the situation may be) that is applied to the members of the Communist Party will be, or that applied to those individuals who, with a certain degree of dialectical temptation and out of needs related to their own internal party consumption, have publicly excluded themselves, but who may well feel that, if others go, they should not remain behind at the critical time. In this regard, the authorities for the dialog will not take certain incidental comments literally.

At this point in their experience, the organizers of this work system must realize that the real political circumstances cannot be the ostensible acts of their protagonists, in which case there is justification for the extensive manner in which the minister of interior and his "staff" are analyzing certain situations. With the passage of time, the categorical self-exclusion of Mr Enrique de Vedia may not be such; nor that of others who, although they may reject the political bases a priori, consider it more feasible to say so to Harguindeguy himself, in his office. If appearances are accepted purely and simply, there would also be no obstacle to inviting members of the Communist Party; but there is nothing to prove that its native orthodox leaders have abandoned the most rank Marxism-Leninism, not even resorting to the mimicry of other fellow party members in the West. In this connection, we should mention a document distributed by the Communist Party, bearing the signature of Mr Rodolfo Ghioldi, on the occasion of the anniversary of Lenin's birth. It states that Marxism-Leninism "is all-powerful, because it is accurate." This irrepressible outburst of doctrinal modesty (at a time when Moscow is fighting with the Afghan people) is supplemented with the claim that "the workers in all countries have adopted the cause of the Soviet Union."

Triangular Reality

This new, significant role of the minister of interior could help to find the answers to certain key political matters this year, and during the part of next year associated with the Videla government. It would be intolerable if a careful analyst of the recent past were to ignore the fact that the constant presence of Martinez de Hoz and his homogeneous group in the government does not have much to do with the strong confidence that the president

has placed in them. It would be no less naive to disregard the fact that, in this "ranking" of political and personal loyalties, General Harguindeguy occupies one of the vertexes of the triangle. The head of government and his minister of interior will have to carry out the great political operation entrusted to them by the Military Junta; but, in order to guarantee success, its context cannot be other than that given it by the results of an economic administration the positive results of which (as Martinez de Hoz is now in the habit of reiterating) are beginning to appear. It seems obvious that Videla's government will be judged, when it ends, by the state of the economy at that time, and by its progress over the distances that have separated the authorities from the political movements. Hence, this year will be constantly traversing those realities, with three given names and a surname. If this is so, it will surely be because the Military Junta has suitable interpreters in them.

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CSO: 3010

ARGENTINA

GHISANI: MENDOZA WILL NOT SERVE AS POLITICAL EXPERIMENT

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 29 Jan 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] Mendoza (NA)--The future governor of Mendoza, Brig Gen (ret) Rolando Ghisani, denied here that any political experiment would be attempted during his administration, including any involving leaders of the local Democratic Party in his cabinet.

Ghisani, who was appointed by the national executive branch on Thursday, 10 January, to succeed the outgoing Brig Gen (ret) Jorge Fernandez, arrived in Mendoza yesterday from the federal capital in an Air Force plane.

He was met by the minister of government, Commodore Teofilo Ramirez Dolan, the secretary general of government, Commodore (ret) Manuel Alvarez, and other officials from the province.

In a brief dialog with the press, he said that he had not wanted to make statements anywhere but in Mendoza, "because I want to clear up all the rumors that have been circulating about the group that will work with me."

Brig General Ghisani said that he would assume his duties in mid-February, adding: "Right now, we are working on the formation of the cabinet that will assist me, but unfortunately, rumors which are untrue have been circulating."

He remarked: "Mention has been made of names of individuals from the province as joining a cabinet to which no such consideration has ever been given;" although he gave notice that, "The cooperation of those Mendozans, like that of anyone else, will be welcome in the working group."

He said: "Brig General Graffigna has already denied the existence of any intention of conducting a political experiment in Mendoza. We are considering whether there will be any fundamental changes, and whether the people now in the cabinet will be replaced."

The Names Mentioned

Immediately upon the announcement of Ghisani's appointment as governor of Mendoza, sources associated with the local Democratic Party disclosed that several leaders of that political party would be appointed to the provincial cabinet.

Those sources mentioned Bonifacio Cejuela for the Ministry of Economy; Alfredo Costa for Finance; Federico Vargas Galindez for the Ministry of Government; and Horacio Arnut and Jorge Zapata Mercader as other members of the future cabinet.

Ghisani said that his visit to Mendoza "is of a personal nature," and that he would hold a meeting with the outgoing Brig General Fernandez, "who, in addition to having been my superior, is my friend, through whom I will make contact with the situation in the province."

In conclusion, he also denied the rumors concerning the length of his term in office, explaining: "There has been a great deal of speculation on that subject, and the only true fact is that the term for the governors is the same as that for the presidents."

2909

CSO: 3010

ARGENTINA

CASTRO MADERO ENDORSES STAND ON GRAIN EMBARGO

Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish 30 Jan 80 p 5

[Text] Last night in Brasilia, the chairman of the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), Vice-Adm Carlos Castro Madero (who confirmed the prediction made by CLARIN yesterday regarding the signing of a nuclear treaty with Brazil this coming May), stated that Argentina "cannot and should not support the North Americans in the grain boycott of the Soviet Union."

Castro Madero's visit to Brazil coincided with the presence of the special envoy of the president of the United States, Gen Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, who had been in Buenos Aires previously, seeking support in both countries for the boycott advocated by the United States against the USSR, in retaliation for its armed invasion of Afghanistan.

The CNEA chairman explained to newsmen that, "For every dollar that Argentina sells to the United States, it buys two; whereas the Soviet Union sells it \$5.00 for each one that is imported."

He stressed: "For this reason, we cannot and should not support the North Americans in the matter of the grain boycott." Vice-Adm Carlos Castro Madero then denied that the national government "has backed down" in its position since the visit by Carter's envoy.

Castro Madero continued: "In 1979, the Soviet Union purchased 19 percent of its grain supplies directly from Argentina," and now our country's government has pledged not to accrue artificial benefits from the North American embargo," which could be interpreted to mean that it will not divert wheat from other countries to be sold to the Soviets at more compensatory prices."

He also gave a reminder that the Argentine Government's commitment is not to increase the supply of wheat to the Russians beyond the quota preset by both countries. He remarked: "But whereas, last year, we sold 19 percent of the Soviet purchases and, in 1980, we shall reach 25 percent, for example, due to the natural increment in the market, that could not be considered an increase in the supply."

After stating that backing for the boycott could not be guaranteed based on the next harvests of sorghum, wheat and soybeans, he commented: "Argentina already has contracts signed with several East European countries, and does not intend to break them."

He was emphatic in stating: "What would be our situation in the future, if there is a 'detente' between the United States and the Soviet Union?"

A member of the Argentine delegation added that the latter point was put in that way to General Goodpaster in Buenos Aires, "and he had nothing to offer us by way of a guarantee."

The spokesman for the Brazilian president, Joao Baptista Figueiredo, reported that the government of that country, for its part, reaffirmed its position of "not making special efforts to replace the amount of grain that would cease to be sold by the United States."

In Brasilia, it was commented that Goodpaster's position was more cautious in Brazil, and seemed less vehement than in Argentina. The informant concluded by saying: "But he spent more time with President Figueiredo explaining the North American position than asking for support."

Confirmation

On the nuclear issue itself, Vice Admiral Castro Madero confirmed the fact that an agreement will actually be signed in Buenos Aires in May, when General Figueiredo visits Argentina; and said that "the nuclear agreement is what will be given most attention" on that occasion.

He reaffirmed the fact that his visit was aimed at establishing the areas wherein effective cooperation could be arranged, and said that he wanted the head of NUCLEBRAS [Brazilian Nuclear Corporations], Paulino Nogueira, and of the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), Hervasio Carvalho, to visit Argentina before the signing.

Castro Madero's visit began on Monday, and the agenda was slightly changed as a result of the length of his talks with the minister of mines and energy, Cesar Cals, and the minister of foreign affairs, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, on the first day.

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IMPORTANCE, SCOPE OF GOODPASTER'S VISIT REVIEWED

Buenos Aires ULTIMA CLAVE in Spanish 29 Jan 80 pp 2-464, 3-464

[Text] The second half of January must be devoted completely and as a priority to the visit by the general (with four stars, and a degree in philosophy, former commander of NATO and current head of West Point), Andrew Jackson Goodpaster, President Carter's special envoy. His presence among us was not announced when he reached Argentine soil, but afterwards; something which leaves room for speculation regarding the extreme confidentiality that surrounded his mission at the outset.

Why did General Goodpaster come? Of course, his presence was prompted by the U.S.-Argentine dispute over the grain embargo; but it is obvious that his authority could not be confined to the aforementioned matter, because it is, moreover, not his specialty. One would be less inclined to imagine General Goodpaster dealing with figures on tonnages of graniferous sorghum, corn and wheat production and the oil content of soybean seed than, with pointer in hand, explaining to a military class gathered in front of a map of the world the immediate prospects of a U.S.-Russian confrontation over Afghanistan, and the Russian obsession for warm-water seas, in this case the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. President Carter made an intelligent decision to immediately send to Buenos Aires an envoy on the professional level of General Goodpaster, at the very time when the possibility of a confrontation on a worldwide scale demands the meeting, and not the dispersion, of countries which are intrinsically, historically and spiritually friends.

The designation of a military man, and Goodpaster specifically, indicates to any moderately well informed observer that the center of American policy decisions regarding Argentina has recently shifted from the realm of the State Department to other sectors of activity in the United States. Anyone who tries to draw conclusions about the relations between the U.S. Armed Forces and its government, or between the former and foreign policy per se, or other governments, runs the risk of succumbing to an entanglement of errors, concerning which we need not expatiate. But the fact is

that the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy, at least insofar as our country is concerned, has been turned toward a sector which disregards motives related to that country's domestic policy, expressing itself from a more realistic angle and dissociated from sectorial interests.

The second fact is that relating to the active participation that the minister of economy, Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, has assumed in the emergency. Both in the first phase of the crisis, when Argentina published its statement, and in this second phase, that of the arrival of General Goodpaster in the country, Dr Martinez de Hoz's presence indicated that his judgment and opinion were influential. One account ascribed to the minister of economy a decisive role in the final preparation of the statement (or, what is equivalent to this, in the establishment of the basic line noted in the emergency); something which may now be corroborated by his participation in the dialogs held with General Goodpaster.

A Thorough Revision

General Goodpaster's arrival in Argentina represented a thorough revision in the guidelines observed by the United States in its policy toward our country. When the communique refusing Argentina's participation in the grain embargo on the USSR was made public, there were many who agreed in citing these two points in the document as predominant: 1. the objection to the "halfway measures" involved in a merely commercial blockade which, in fact, produced inequitable burdens on the parties in question who, incidentally, had not even been consulted; 2. the establishment of an international line designed to oppose Soviet aggression in Afghanistan or in any other part of the world "to the final consequences," and using "appropriate means," which is tantamount to saying through the proportionate, suitable use of force.

In this way, it was impossible to confuse the Argentine position with a hesitant or soft attitude toward Soviet aggression. This, indeed, underscored the value of sovereignty in establishing guidelines for behavior on the international level.

This situation caused the Argentine position to become an alert to the U.S. foreign policy, to the point where the decision-making center shifted from the State Department to sectors wherein this type of issue involves objectives at stake which are of more definite significance. It is obvious, when one compares the statements made by Hodding Carter, the State Department's spokesman, to the effect that the United States "will not negotiate policy on human rights," with the real emergency status of the Goodpaster visit, that the results are quite different.

If one can give credence to a rumor disseminated last weekend, the change in the U.S. foreign policy toward Argentina does not involve human rights alone, but goes much further. Raul Castro was said to be the bearer of

a message addressed to the Argentine Government wherein all the issues involved in the relations between the two countries were restated. The document, consisting of about eight pages, began by stating that it was necessary to reconsider the conditions under which those relations have been proceeding, so as to lend them a "more realistic quality." In one of its sections, it expresses the United States' desire to serve as a backer in the international forums in all problems "besetting Argentina." After the vague reference to "international forums," an exact reference is made, limited to the United Nations. Since Argentina has no dispute in this forum except for one that might stem from the human rights issue, it is clear that the reference is confined to this matter.

But the message goes considerably further when, in discussing the need to compensate for any financial or economic decline in Argentina, it makes specific mention of nuclear policy, regarding which the United States would be willing to change the positions that it has assumed up until now.

The significance and scope of these matters is clear to any analyst of foreign policy, particularly when a veiled reference appears to economic relations with the Soviet Union which, in their broader sense, involve a part of the Southern Cone, through the Salto Grande dam and other projects that are under way wherein the Soviet presence appears important.

If the memorandum used by Mr Castro as a "message" from Carter to the Argentine Government proves significant, it is obvious that Hodding Carter, Patricia Derian and some of the other mentors of Carter's policy on human rights could experience a heavy attack promptly.

General Goodpaster, who is a "hawk," arrived with a multifarious and extensive agenda. It occurs to us that he came to Buenos Aires less on behalf of the grain embargo than apropos of it. He came, essentially, because Argentina belongs to the Western world. And we seem to keep reading on the pages of his agenda about human rights, oil, food, nuclear policy, the Southern Cone and other aspects of a strategy which involves all of us democrats in the entire world.

But what becomes clear, after reading the official communique and some related items which have not been expressed in print, is that there has begun between Washington and Buenos Aires a detailed, in-depth analysis of their relations which may perhaps very soon assume the dimensions of a complete reconsideration with whatever intensity and urgency may be required.

2909
CSO: 3010

BOLIVIA

PUEBLO URGES OTHER TROOPS, OFFICERS TO ORGANIZE POLITICALLY

La Paz EL DIARIO in Spanish 27 Jan 80 Supplement pp 1-8

[PUEBLO [For a Bolivian State Free of Oppression], a military organization of Bolivian Army officers and noncommissioned officers, issues an appeal to the youth of the armed forces and to all Bolivians. Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Introduction

We of PUEBLO, created as a renovated organization within the ranks of the armed forces of the nation, at this time in which partisan political life and antimilitary trickery have decided upon in-depth changes with the objective of maintaining the power of certain groups who are the intermediaries for foreign interests in state agencies and the only means of effecting a profound robotization and subjugation of the Bolivian people, address ourselves to our comrades and to the citizens of the country to make known the fundamental points of view which affect the future of the country.

And we do this because we have decided to participate politically in national reconstruction, something perhaps irreverent up to now, although in countries such as ours which are dependent on metropolitan economies, politics is one of the most specific activities which determines the true sentiments of the people. It was not idly stated by Napoleon Bonaparte, that heroic military man and statesman of world rank, who saved the French Revolution from disorder, betrayal and internal struggles of the revolutionaries of that time, and whose historical merits no one has been able to tarnish, that politics is destiny.

Bolivia, which has lived a situation of open struggle against domestic and foreign domination, is compelled to engage in politics, for that reason its social groups, its state, cultural, civic and production institutions cannot treat political activity as an abstraction. No one can be alien to that manifestation, and with that understanding, anti-politics is a detestable word, acceptable only by nonexistent, submissive or frustrated minds. No rational being can deny that he belongs to a

certain institution, a certain status or that he is in a certain place. We are all subject to social, economic, cultural and political conditions and, therefore, we are all called upon to act in the various areas of collective life, of Bolivian life. This is even more so with respect to military men, because having the mission entrusted to us by the state through the political constitution of the state, we are subject to the contingencies, conditions and characteristics of public life, which means politics. That is why those who today say that military men should not engage in politics are not invoking a right, but are using "their" right, their need to inhibit us, to isolate us, to subordinate us to their interests, to emasculate our thinking and our actions.

In the history of Bolivia, when it has been suitable for the politicians of the time, they have requested that the armed forces act; at other times, they have prevented their political participation. Their positions toward military involvement in politics have always been mendacious, fickle and low. When the MNR [National Revolutionary Movement] wanted to rise to power in the government, it placed itself behind a military man: Colonel Villarroel. Thwarted in their national-socialist attempt, they had him hanged from a lamppost in Murillo Square. Almost the same behavior was employed by the ultraright when the military men proved an obstacle to their appetites. They hurled the people out into the streets against them, and having failed with Herzog and Urriolagoita, they resorted to Gen Hugo Ballivan. Something similar happened in the 30's. When the leftists wanted to gain prominence again, they placed themselves behind Toro and Busch. The ultraright of that time, incompetent and corrupt, defended itself with Quintanilla and Penaranda, making the errors and betrayals of the economic and political powers fall upon the image of the armed forces. Weakening the national revolution of the MNR, Victor Paz began to praise the army. In turn, the poor began to urge the armed forces to defend their new positions. General Barrientos was surrounded by those of the PIR [Party of the Revolutionary Left] and General Ovando by all the Maoist and the Muscovite Left. Newsman Ted Cordova composed some cuecas [Chilean dances] for General Torres, which were sung by all the palace leftists, who today are legislators, democrats, civil rightists and antimilitarists. The Bolivian Socialist Falange [FSB] surrounded General Banzer, enjoying his power, and now it says that the military must return to the barracks because they are the only ones who have the right to be in public life as the politicians they are. There is one last military chief, he of the banner with a phantom following. He is Quiroga Santa Cruz, whose antimilitary ideology is based on his hate for General Ovando, who removed him from the office which had accepted the losses suffered by Gulf Oil in Bolivia.

Structurally, however, there is something more categorical in those opposed positions of party politics which do not want to have the armed forces indulge in politics. The reason is that since 15 years ago, when the army repelled the invasion by Castroite guerrillas, Marxist extremism has been proclaiming the nonpolitical nature of military men to the four winds because it knows that direct involvement by the armed forces in the political life of Bolivia is an insurmountable barrier to their disintegrating and subjugating pretensions. The same thing is true about the small groups with economic power, who anxious to return a government of undefined nature, drew closer to the army through General Padilla and now that it is of no use to them, they advocate the nonpolitical nature of the military, their return to the barracks and their neutrality.

Someone has said that politics of the worst is the worst of politics, but there is something that is even worse: the denial of politics. Perhaps that is why the people of Bolivia have never denied the practice of politics to anyone, least of all to the military. This is so true that only because of military political activity have the people been oriented along the path of social welfare, peace, tranquility, freedom and progress. What the people say in the streets must be heeded today. With their extraordinary capacity for intuitive discernment, they say that there remains only one national institution that can deal with political debacle, the installations of fraudulent government systems, hunger, poverty, and the deceit and enrichment of pseudodemocracy: the armed forces. A truth of such weight that no present power group, no media spokesman, no noisy militancy could refute.

In this respect, to address ourselves to our comrades in the armed forces of the nation with this document of political content is not the commission of an error, or as could be supposed, the embarkation on a dangerous road into forbidden territory. No. In no way. To speak politically and to refer to the present political problem; to analyze the situation pertinent to each of us, is a civic and patriotic need because it affects the future of Bolivia, the people, our families and also the responsibilities we have as professionals.

I. Background

No Bolivian, therefore, no military man, can remain aloof from discussion of the latest events and their future effects. Only their review can clarify for us the type and scope of responsibility the armed forces now has in the destinies of the country, and also what our future in the process is, particularly now that an obsolete party system is attempting to take over the government once more, and with its machinery, plunge the country into the most merciless exploitation; the destruction of the armed forces being viewed as an unavoidable requirement for the attainment of that miserable objective.

After a detailed examination of the present political phenomenon and of its many variables, PUEBLO has arrived at a single conclusion: /The serious problem now facing the citizenry is the struggle being waged among the political forces against the people in an attempt to control the government so as to guarantee an effective electoral fiction, better known as a fraud, in view of the absence of the people, who reject the democracy imposed from antinational centers of power. /

International ultraleft ideology, branched off into Bolivian parties and unions, is the main petitioner for democratic principles, knowing full well that the democracy advocated in Bolivia is not sincere because it is manipulated from transnational control centers. It is the greatest devotee of the democratic process--distorted or not--because certainly it has no other recourse for promoting itself politically, its disastrous defeats in its attempts to seize power directly (read "revolution") being well known. For its objective, it turns to the organizational disguise of the UDP, COB or PRIN [People's Democratic Union, Bolivian Labor Federation Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left, respectively]. The traditional parties, consisting of the MNR led by Victor Paz Estenssoro and Walter Guevara Arze, who in the various movements and alternatives they promote, because of a lack of popular support, resort to the control of the government as the ideal electoral instrument in order to guarantee his leadership of the machinery of fraud.

The people of Bolivia, who in the 9 July 1978 elections and those of 1 July 1979 were the silent electorate because they were not registered in the records, did not vote and were not consulted, have been ignored and subjected insensitively to hunger and repression, have only one interest: the solution of the economic and social problems of the country and their own. However, they do not have the means to organize a national or sectoral program of demands because they are disorganized by the betrayal of their political and union leaders.

In the framework of reference of the political characteristics emphasized, it is impossible to foresee any long-range solutions, particularly if the satisfaction of existing needs is relegated to a secondary level. For this reason it is foreseen that the prolongation of the game of electoral combinations will only result in the irreversible ruin of Bolivia.

The armed forces of the nation, because of the socioeconomic and political situation observed in the country, and particularly because of the present correlation of political forces, despite the campaign against them and despite the attempts at "onliness" of the political party stems, have directly and involuntarily become, not only a factor, but a /desideratum/. At present, their political participation being unavoidable, both the political and nonpolitical forces refer to their decisions, automatically making them a direct part of the state, which means making them part of the democratic failure so that they can then accuse them of being responsible.

That is the way it has been happening since last 1 November. Rather than as an initiative of their own, the facts and reasons behind that participation by the armed forces in the political life of the country should be developed as a factor to be used for a precise understanding, for a review of the process, for a direct and responsible participation by the armed forces of the nation in the future events of the country on solid bases which also show that the Bolivian military men are part of the people, are concerned about the country, are concerned about the future.

II. Fraudulent Elections

It is a well known principle that formulas of coexistence cannot be created under the present and complex societies without a broad base of popular consent and support. However, the many national parties, within the framework of the democratic process, have tried to impose their own rules, sufficient reason for the failure of the two successive elections, which attempted to bring about a democratic assumption of government. Of the two, the latter, without having ceased to be fraudulent, definitely marked the failure of imposed democracy, not only because of the results of the vote counts but also because of the results brought about by the persistence of errors.

The failure of last 1 July can be established on six different levels:

- 1) /It was established by an imposed electoral strategy/, without consent and with parties which only existed in alliances. /It was illegal/ because no /de facto/ government has the authority to call for presidential elections. /It was without consensus/ because the party system without party members took it upon itself to establish the rules of the game. It participated in the elections with an /artificial party system/ whose quantitative and qualitative poverty was disguised as fronts and alliances which tried to impose their will.
- 2) A government was imposed to apply that arbitrary strategy. The coup d'etat by Gen David Padilla, was made possible, organized and carried out by the Paz Estenssoro party. The good face of the government, tolerated with good reason by the country, was the call for elections with the operative consensus of democratization. The tragic part of the strategy, which turned into a trick, was that the government of Gen Padilla placed itself unconditionally at the service of the candidacy of Victor Paz Estenssor. For that purpose, he grossly misused the National Electoral Court and as repayment he was allowed to misgovern without complaints, which resulted in the scandalous swindle of Karachipampa, the bribes paid in the imports of Pakistani rice, the contraband in automobiles, which were offered for sale openly from Government Palace, the extension of the lease of COMIBOL's [Mining Corporation of Bolivia] Porco Mine to COMSUR [expansion unknown], the privileges granted to the nonstate mining enterprise, the smuggling of wild animal skins from the eastern part of the country and the smuggling of rare woods on a large scale. Since the Karachipampa swindle is of common knowledge in all the country, those democratizers of that time such as General Padilla, Raul Lopez Leyton,

Gary Prado and the rest of the members of that government, known as "institutionalists," were fittingly renamed by the people as the "Karachipampas," once they had handed over the government to the sponsors of the "constitutional alternative."

3) The ultraleft parties, represented by the UDP, were the most tolerant of the electoral farce carried out by the "government" of General Padilla, explicable not precisely because of their devotion to democracy, to the military man or militarism, but because since the 60's, every coupist attempt having failed, they only had one chance: participate in presidential elections once more with the assurance of obtaining undeniable successes, thanks to the experience acquired in the elections of the previous year where they gave some masterly lessons in fraud, using large financial resources to attack the will of the voters, stuffing illegal ballot boxes and bribing representatives of the electoral courts throughout the country.

4) There was the manipulation of the ideological sentiments and principles of the people and armed forces, of which Paz Estenssoro was in charge, and he countered the UDP candidate with his own candidate. "The least of the evils" was the rule which placed the people and the armed forces in favor of his candidate, Hernan Siles Suazo, who was described as Castro-Communist but was actually only opportunistic and a bridgehead for Muscovite positions. The working and rural people were also pitted against the ADN [Nationalist Democratic Alliance], with the argument of its inherent ultraright stance. Therefore, the MNR of Paz, which started as an insignificant group, went on to become an "unavoidable alternative" against the danger of the extremisms. It is possible that the scheme would have been uncontested if it had not been for the distrust of young officers of the armed forces, who in their time scored the misgovernment of the "Karachipampas" and the Paz Estenssoro fraud.

5) There was the role played by the bureaucratic group of the union leaders of the COB, the National Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia, and other proletarian personnel, who also supported the game, lending themselves to becoming candidates to Congress from the UDP as well as from the MNR of Paz. Only Juan Lechnin, in his attempt to play cards in the long term, separated himself from that headlong electoral enthusiasm, which in no way affected the comedy.

6) The decisive influence of the democratizing policy for South America, which President Carter employed in his desperation to impose his plan in Bolivia in order to insure a greater imperial profit for the multinationals, within the framework of "political purity," would replace military dictators with "constitutional leaders" in such a way that popular resistance to the dictator would not be transferred to the imperialist penetration and control, and the sympathy and support for the multinationals, Carter's support for Victor Paz Estenssoro and German

Social Democrat support for Siles Suazo, which was seconded by Soviet and Maoist coexistence supporters, were the trump card of a senile and complaisant multiparty system, which wounded the dignity of the people and the principle of self-determination, fortunately rebuffed by the absence of the rural and urban citizenry in the elections.

In other words, the electoral failure was not due to the poor handling of the electoral process, to voter practices or to irregularities in the counting, because the entire scheme had been prepared beforehand. /The cause was electoral fraud./ The only thing that was done in the counting was to juggle the numbers to justify the results prepared much in advance of the elections by the fraudulent machine consisting of Victor Paz Estenssoro, Walter Guevara and David Padilla, as the master minds, and the then minister of interior and the president of the National Electoral Court, Col Raul Lopez Leyton and Marcelo Cespedes, respectively, as executors.

A forecast of failure, despite the almost perfect operation of the electoral fraud machine, was, for example, absenteeism only 30 days before the elections. Only 400,000 voters had signed up at the Civic Registers, which meant almost 20 percent of the total. For this reason, without any shame at all, President Padilla declared 31 May a holiday so that the citizenry could register. Another measure was mandatory registration. This was something without precedent in Bolivian political history.

The whole truth is that after the great preelectoral, electoral and post-electoral shame, the numerical picture of the fraud was as follows: 1.8 million citizens registered and 200,000 registered voters failed to vote.

450,000 votes declared fraudulent.

Total: 1.15 million votes.

There were 1,150,000 votes nominally cast for the election of representatives of the branches of the state. This means that 23 percent of the five million inhabitants were directly involved, which is not compatible with a real, certain, undebatable and lasting democratic action.

To this is added the psychological terrorism to which the country was subjected, threatened with a military coup, a Banzer coup and a communist insurrection. That was the work of the Paz Estenssoro propaganda machine, intended to intimidate the people and the armed forces until the votes could be distributed at Coliseo Cerrado. In that respect, such was the cunning of the movement that it even went as far as to boast that checking of the votes was being done "by computers;" but it was also so contradictory and so crooked that while it was announcing the counting of votes on computers, the checking of only 1.6 million votes took a month, perhaps because the computers were manually operated.

In the end, as was announced beforehand by the president of the National Electoral Court, everyone received votes, even those who had never thought they would obtain one, including one of the thugs, who in Banzer's time worked as undersecretary of interior and who by this trickery was named deputy from Cochabamba. The numbers game played with the will of the people, was so shameless that the distribution of votes silenced the voices of those who were harmed, those who had proclaimed their victory even while they were being defeated by the greater cunning of their adversaries. Such was the case of the UDP, which had announced its victory with a million votes. It did not even receive 40 percent of the number of total votes in the fraudulent process, not because it did not have the capability to be involved in fraud, but because the electoral machinery was under the control of the alliance of movements of Paz Estenssoro, which despite all the panoply it used, still had enough sense not to adjudge to itself the parliamentary representations needed for his election, at least in Congress. The drama and realism he tried to give the fraud saved him from an avalanche of national discontent headed by the UDP. The people would have certainly risen up against the barefaced partition of representatives, which Lopez Leyton and Marcelo Cespedes, of sad memory in the country, had accomplished for the "chief."

The last thing that the electoral party system accomplished was the public acceptance of the proposal for a "national accord," in order to sanctify the results achieved and avoid the intervention of the armed forces, which could have easily annulled those censurable attempts at a democracy without the people.

For his part, Hernan Siles Suazo was predisposed not to question the simple majority won by Victor Pax Estenssoro so as not to destroy the "normal" image of the electoral process before the world. However, he played his last internal card--always within the framework of fraud--that of the idea of popular pressure for the Congress to elect the overall winner and not simply the one who had the most voters. The other party groups attacked the decisions of the two "great" political fronts with the exception of the Socialists, which always the clown, showed much public indignation, although internally it was surprised and happy at the number of votes handed to it by the Ministry of Interior.

III. Violation of the Constitution

The days between 1 July and 2 August passed by in the midst of the greatest public scandal, which could only be neutralized by the terrorism unleashed from the Ministry of Interior itself, whose spokesmen let it be known that if the UDP won, communism would be imposed on Bolivia. Similarly, if the ADN won, the workers and political leaders would be persecuted, in short, that the victory of the MNR of Victor Paz Estenssoro was the solution needed. Within the armed forces themselves, in order to disarm any violent reaction against the electoral fraud,

the organization of a military coup was simulated through General Padilla, a coup which had to take place, said the hidden spokesmen, if Hernan Siles Suazo and the MIR turned the electoral or parliamentary results in their favor. In this manner, the expectations and behavior of the country were conditioned to the victory of Paz and the necessary defeat of Siles as the great democratic alternative, even though it was just another part of a great fraud being imposed by peaceful means.

/What no one imagined was that Congress itself,/ poorly elected and even more poorly constituted, /would then go on to commit the most shameful violation of the political constitution of the state./

Undeniably, the pointer on the scale in seeking the objective of democracy, is the /effective action which gives legitimacy to events./ Similarly, fulfillment of the /will of the people is legal only when the substantive and objective provisions of the basic law of the state are respected.

While fraud was masked in the 1 July elections to such an extreme that the operation of Congress was tolerated, always within a pseudodemocratic framework which prevailed because the country required political solutions in order to go on to structural solutions, /the failure became shamefully obvious when the Congressional election of the president and vice president of the republic from among those candidates who had obtained simple majorities became impossible./ However, the post-electoral machinery, squelching the entire democratic and organic principle, assumed the guise of constitutionality in its hour of need, not in order to climb into government, but rather to preserve the appearance of a democracy, although it was historically unsuccessful, for its patron-leaders of the foreign centers of imperial power.

While the armed forces watched, observing this new deception against the people, only the COB had enough political courage--although opportunistic--to warn about the imposition of electing a president of the republic without constitutional authority. For that reason it ordered a national 24-hour strike "as a protest against the fraud by the National Electoral Court and as a rejection against the imminent appointment of the proimperialist Paz Estenssoro as president of the republic..." (PRESENCIA, 2 August 1979).

Thus, when the Congress met, of 144 representatives, only 68 voted for Paz Estenssoro and 46 for Hernan Siles Suazo. The senile leader of the MNR alliance was sentenced to postpone his presidential aspirations because of a lack of five votes. The congressmen, about to be destroyed by the results of the resounding electoral failure--which would have determined the definitive death of the old national party system--agreed to violate nothing less than the Political Constitution of the State. In this endeavor, which in political history will surely be known as the most negative political outrage, the ADN and APIN [Popular Alliance For National Integration] representatives in Congress served effectively when

Senator Tineo proposed the "constitutional" solution of a free interpretation of Articles 90, 91 and 93 of the Constitution in such a way that the president of Congress, the second senator from Cochabamba, Walter Guevara Arze, would be appointed "interim constitutional" president. On the other hand, the FSB of the Bernalista "alliance," supporting the proposition, advocated "a juridico-institutional revolution (?) before we have to become involved in a revolution such as that of Nicaragua in Bolivia," in the words of Mario Serrate P., supported by David Anez Pedraza of the leftist sector of the APIN Falange. The MNR of Paz and the UDP of Hernan Siles, basing themselves on the "good" theory of the "useful dupes," gave free reign to the process and on 16 August actually elected the second senator from Cochabamba, Walter Guevara Arze, as interim constitutional president of the republic, /violating the Political Constitution of the State in complicity with all the party members in Congress who took part in that obscene, undemocratic game, which usurped the will of the people, the only ones with the right to elect the Constitutional President of the Republic./ Of all the congressional representatives, only one dared to denounce the violation of the Political Constitution of the State and the distortion of the democratic process. He was rural Professor Julio Tumiri of Mitka, who said: "Unfortunately, things are being decided behind the people's backs."

As of that time, the democracy falsely institutionalized in Bolivia marched along paths which were much more tortuous than those of fascism, because while the people and the continent were made to believe that it was freely elected, it had a prior de facto existence. In actuality it had the authority granted to it by the outgoing government of General Padilla; it did not suffer any pressure of scandal; official parties in the election and the majority of media commentators, ignorant of the violation of constitutional laws, would not have been able to exert that pressure because it was all part of the fraud and there was no one to denounce the outrage. If at that time the armed forces did not go out to enforce the laws of the republic, it was because they decided that it was better that the alleged defenders of the Constitution stew in their own juice.

For the rest, time would be the best judge and accuser of the vices of imposed democracy.

What cannot be left unemphasized is that there was an undeniable violation of the Political Constitution of the State, because in theory, dogma and practice /the only thing that cannot be substituted for is the right of the people to elect their presidents/.

Only a profound political education can allow us to understand this principle that the impostors of Congress have distorted to suit themselves. Among the stabilizing factors of the democratic game it is precisely the /irreversibility of the basic principle of the Political Constitution of the State,/ be it the constitution of the USSR, Communist China or the United States, because /irreversibility is a guiding constitutional

principle, basically inviolable in the sense that it cannot be the object of a reform or interpretation./ In the case of Bolivia, the only thing that Congress could have done when the candidates did not obtain an absolute majority of votes in the general elections was to /proclaim/ the one who had the support of half plus one of the total of the delegates of the people, but in no way could they elect an "interim president" or "administrator" over the official candidates with qualifying votes. /That violation of the basic principle of democracy/ has been the beginning of the end of the pseudoconstitutional process. What happens now /would have its cause in this serious violating antecedent./

IV. A Usurping and Self-Prolonging Government

The Walter Guevara Arze government, as was well-said by the weekly *AQUI*, although it kept in touch with the Congress, a Congress whose makeup is undoubtedly bourgeois, not only because of the ultraright predominance characterized by the extensive representation of the medium-level mining interests but because of its dependence on North American imperialism, was a government by clan. From the minister of interior, passing through the general counsel, down to the daughter of the palace cook, they were all relatives of the president.

Mariano Baptista Gumucio, appointed minister of education by Guevara, said in an evening newspaper belonging to another businessman of the middle-level mining interests that the "Caracas Club" had taken over the government, which meant that the "interim constitutional" government was not even the product of the de facto Congress but a government imposed by Venezuela.

Walter Guevara, his party plans gone awry, concentrated all his efforts in putting together a strategy which would contravene the Congressional resolution of 6 August, which had principally given him two tasks:

- 1) Call for elections for president and vice president, and 2) turn over the government on 6 August 1980 to the winner of the elections. However, weakened by his illegal status, far removed from the centers of power because of his lack of a party base, and discredited by his servile mediation between the country and the great economic interests, he could do little to survive in what time he had left in that inevitable area of contradictions.

The most ever attempted by Dr Guevara to find popular support was to take on the armed forces so as to appear before the leaders of the pseudodemocracy as a great gladiator. He tried to remove the military high commands to save the republic from the "Caesars" of the General Headquarters. He took his role as Captain General of the Armed Forces so seriously that he forgot he was just an ordinary usurper of a legitimate office.

On the other hand, he tried to dictate standards of interdependence to Congress in a period in which, according to his own statements, his government was neither constitutional nor unconstitutional. Guevara made a eloquent explanation. Wishing to emphasize an alleged presidential legitimacy, he reiterated before Congress that he was the legitimate president because he had been elected constitutionally. However, when the Congress tried to exercise its powers and supervise the work of the executive, Guevara explained that his status as president in a transition phase, because it was temporary, ceased to be constitutional, therefore the policy of Congress could not restrict the behavior of the executive. On the other hand, his minister secretary and partner, in order to back that one-of-a-kind reasoning, forwarded other arguments but fell into legal reasonings more in keeping with dictatorial administrations.

The clash was so violent that the divorce between the two branches took place immediat'ly. It was characterized by a threat of interpellation of the entire cabinet, and by the failure of the health of Minister Canelas, who had to leave the Palace.

The tragedy of the president was his definitive alienation from the people who had come to view him favorably because in the first sessions of Congress he showed vigor against the statements the UDP made in favor of Dr Siles Suazo after he had begun his legendary hunger strike, seeking to force the legislators to appoint him constitutional president. The Supreme Decree ordering the advance deposit of 500 percent for the imports of merchandise was passed as part of a package of economic reforms he said he had decided to apply to resolve the economic crisis, which up to 20 October showed a Central Government deficit of 5,390,000,000 Bolivian pesos when in 1978 it had reached 1,745,800,000 pesos. This meant that in only 10 months the deficit had grown by 309 percent. While the purpose behind that decree was to provide carte blanche to large-scale smuggling, what it actually did was to cause an immoderate rise in prices of many allegedly luxury items, the majority of which were for the satisfaction of basic needs.

Finally, his dispute with the COB began when he tried to place restrictions on union growth which began to affect private enterprise.

A government so fragile, without rallying initiatives, without executive capability, could barely survive until the Ninth OAS Assembly. Only the good humor of the people, highlighted by a number of incidents, which were more graceful than those usually initiated by those in Government Palace and the legislature, allowed the maintenance of some equilibrium. The forced seriousness of the government ended when the military garrison of Beni rebelled, leaving the elegant "constitutionally interim" president in his "underwear." Under those conditions, the inauguration of the Ninth OAS Assembly served to allow him to get dressed again, but not with that suit made for him in the lobbies of the legislature. This time it would be with the suit prepared by the "Viceroy of the democracy of the dollar," Cyrus Vance.

But Dr Guevara not only attempted to control the factors of power to extend his term. The ultraleft also reasoned that the elimination of military power would mean the attainment of control over the other factors so that they could be used for the accomplishment of their plans. For that purpose there was nothing better than to bring a suit seeking to place guilt on the military officer who had overthrown the Torres government in 1971. For that they resorted to the myth of the reborn revolutionaries, although the armed forces saw through the maneuver and understood that although the envelope of the suit was addressed to General Banzer, its contents were directed against them and they united and established the measures for their preservation. In turn, Juan Lechin, who hastily sought the strengthening of the leadership he had lost in the great sea of pseudodemocracy, began a more direct diatribe against the military men, which aroused a military reaction resulting in the adoption of a hard line against every political and union plan existing.

Under those circumstances, one of the strokes of genius of the armed forces was that of trying to make of Dr Guevara's government a club to be used against the legislature and Juan Lechin, a move not opposed by the president in his attempts to make the army into a club instead of being one himself. That is why Dr Guevara did not lie in his lectures to the students of San Andres, once his government was lost and in the hands of the lady president of the Chamber of Deputies, when he said that in the Palace breakfasts of the last days prior to his defenestration the commanders had proposed that they would support the plan to prolong his government providing he would close down the legislature and silence the stridenties of Lechin.

In this presidential picture, the one who really began to work with all secrecy, but positively, rebuilding his instruments of political leadership, was Dr Victor Paz, who had with difficulty overcome the trauma of the betrayal of his candidacy. One of the first things he did was to insure the armed forces commander in chief's position for General David Padilla. Actually, that military chief and the team which had carried out the coup d'etat in November 1978 returned, but only to the offices of the General Headquarters, because the officer corps rejected their real return to the military units.

The struggle for the attainment of preelectoral objectives unleashed by the party group of Paz Estenssoro, for insurrectional objectives by the ultra parties (the left and right), and for remaining in power by the government sector, shook the people to their very core. They could not understand that the electoral process having failed, party activity without a quantitative support because of its anachronistic actions, obsolescent doctrines, ideology and programs and its incapacity to lead from the legislature and administer from the executive branch, made insistence on a strictly political framework suicidal.

The difference in a framework of that nature was union activity, the violence unleashed by the COB through stoppages, strikes and protests, the preparation of economic petitions, and the disavowal of government actions of the immediate past and the present. The best maneuver was the manipulation of the expanded national meeting of the Mineworkers Federation of Bolivia [FSMB], which took place in Oruro. In it they managed to block a series of measures which would revise the behavior of the mine workers union leadership and establish an imperative economic petition. Thus, using the specter of a fascist coup, Lechin blocked discussion of the request for the resignation of miner leaders such as Simon Reyes and Oscar Salas and authorization for negotiating the wage petition was obtained. The rank and file had made a request for a basic wage of 5,000 pesos, although later authorization was granted for flexibility in negotiating the request. Thus, another betrayal of the workers was in the making, and with the Greek present of the power acquired, Lechin obtained a privileged position within the official party.

The ultraleft, surpassing itself in its antimilitary campaigns, tried to retreat in the heat of battle, overwhelmed by the steadfast attitude of the armed forces, which responded with valor and lucidity, assuming their role assigned by the state, and also because the people themselves were drawing away from those antimilitary initiatives, which every day became more "Sandinist," and what is worse, because the trial for establishing the guilt of former president Banzer and the military institution had terminated in a low process which deprived it of seriousness. Under those circumstances, Quiroga Santa Cruz appeared as an ordinary story teller who could not prove what he had so glibly initiated.

In the end, the fight was restricted to the opposed activity of two fronts: the government led by President Guevara, and the MNR alliance front led by Paz Estenssoro.

President Guevara Arze, who had failed in his attempt to control the commands of the armed forces, sought to bring them over to his side, except for General Padilla and his supporters of the "Karachipampa" group. The preliminary tasks of the president in this respect were humiliating. In his attempt to replace the army commanding general, Gen Ramo Azero, he ran into a stone wall. Speaking at a formal meeting with commanders and officers of the three forces, Guevara declared he surrendered. He said this, more or less: "I declare I surrender in view of the statements that have been made to me by the three forces...I do not have what you have...you can do what I could not do because you have what I do not have ...I have been deceived by the politicians who informed me incorrectly and by some of your own comrades (pointing toward General Padilla and some of his team)." Defeated in his own lair, the president had to confirm General Azero and other commanders and officers of the country who had met at General Headquarters to deliberate about the preservation of the military and the fate of the country.

In his anguish, Guevara suspended the Supreme Decree on prior Advance Deposits [on imports] and he asked for the help of the legislature and all the parties in his attempt to replace his cabinet with another of partisan unity. The proposal rebuffed, he reassembled his team anyway, including in it a representative of the nonstate mining sector, Oscar Bonifaz, which gave him enough strength in the legislature controlled by middle-level mining representatives.

Finally, two days before the inauguration of the Ninth OAS Assembly, in a surprising change of position, President Guevara called a press conference and unleashed a political storm by proposing to the country that his stay in office be prolonged so that the economic problem could be resolved. He maintained that the forthcoming presidential elections did not make sense if the economic crisis was not solved first. To cap his unusual action, in answer to a question by newsmen, he explained that being the president of Bolivia, he had definitely ceased to be a member of the legislature.

After those actions, everything that came after was the undoubted result of his misgovernment, of his ambition to remain as president, and also a genuine demonstration of the political imposition which predominated and still predominates in the leadership of the decaying parties which play at democracy and only want power in their own name even if the people are left without the right to an opinion, without bread, without housing and dignity.

And they are not empty phrases which judge that dishonorable government leadership. Could there be a reply to just this sole demonstration? No one should allow himself to be deceived by appearances in the political field, particularly if it is the politics of fraud. It so happens that the Supreme Decree on Advance Deposits was not a form of naivete by former President Guevara. Before its passage, as customs collections in the east, through his director of customs, he received some 20 million Bolivian pesos every week. With the passage of the Advance Deposit, which opened an enormous door to smuggling, he was trying to receive, from that source and that area alone, some 100 million or more Bolivian pesos per week, regardless of the fact that the cost of living would have increased in the urban and rural centers, as indeed it did increase thanks to that decision. And then they try to accuse the armed forces of being the enemy of the people!

Finally, what had happened to the government? Because it was illegitimate and an impostor, it failed because of a lack of popular support and the incompetence of his collaborators, all of them improvised and intermediaries of economic interests, who could have indiscriminately served either a dictatorship or a pseudodemocracy.

The president, lacking charisma, very much imbued with his former role as minister of interior, divested of his commitments to the MNR alliance, divested of his commitments to the legislature and trampling on the resolution of last 6 August, was enmeshed in the diabolical nets of those who felt themselves betrayed. That was all. The rest is part of exculpatory speculations.

V. The Diabolical Solution

There is no doubt that a government system, characterized by its concentration of power and a large dose of hostility in the process that placed it in office, is a failed system, but a system capable of dragging with it in its fall all those who were involved in its rise to power. Perhaps because of the latter fact the government of Guevara remained in power although it was actually in the throes of a sad death.

Victor Paz Estenssoro had to be the politician who proposed to take advantage of the situation in order to recover the positions he had lost. He noted that he had no place in the Guevara plans to extend his term in office because the more the call to elections was delayed, the more he lost any chance he had of becoming a victorious presidential candidate in a democratic way.

We already know that opposed objective interests, values and ideals can involve men, groups and countries in a simultaneously conflictive and consensual process. But we also know that such conflict can be contrived. Historically, here in Bolivia, operations and strategies have been carried out to obtain the necessary quota of subversion to install and reinstall certain political systems, or to impose certain social conditions. In either case, the tortuous manipulations of either position on the right or left is implicit.

One of those contrived incidents was the 21 July 1946 revolution. It was so contrived that the movements of that time themselves still accuse the author of the agitation of unspeakable objectives, although time later demonstrated the true purposes which those typically unscrupulous political agitations had.

Fausto Reinaga, a prolific writer and almost the founder of the MNR, does a good job of describing the events of 20 November 1944, which led to those of 21 July 1946:

"Villarroel, a superior being but trusting as a child, had to share power with Victor Paz Estenssoro, who did nothing to help him. He subordinated persons, events, ideals, crisis, circumstances, influences '20 November 1944,' in short, everything, all the power of government, to his ambition: that of 'taking the chair away from Villarroel as soon as possible.' He never wanted, or allowed, those of the movements to draw closer, to know or become intimate with the military. On the contrary, he created conditions for them to insult each other.

"As if the revolution were a forbidden task, a crime or a sacrilege, he instituted diplomatic deals, appointing 'chosen' persons for the mission. Secrecy, tale-bearing and gossip replaced the open and sincere friendship (how much better it would have been if there had been unity) between the two revolutionary forces: the MNR and the army. Because PE (read Victor Paz Estenssoro) erected a wall of distrust and suspicion between them, civilians and military men never got to know each other except in adversity: confinement, exile or jail. That is the way it is. It is true that 'for the first time the army was not an instrument of the Rosca, and for the first time a civilian party did not buy the military commanders with money, but rather one and the other pledged to free the country from the chains of the Rosca strictly on the basis of patriotism. That military group was led by Maj Gualberto Villarroel and the party was the MNR. And in this supreme and holy task ask: 'Who betrayed whom?' Villarroel and his military comrades did not betray. As a homage to their commitment and loyalty to the revolution they died hanging from a lamppost.' And the gang? The gang 'waits' for power. (Pamphlet quoted from 'My Inofientes,' page 17).

"The revolutionary ideas and emotions of Villarroel were packed into the 'theory and program' of PE. The revolution wound up in defeat and Villarroel on the lamppost. And for PE, after the lamppost came the cannibalistic verse: 'With Villarroel dead, power awaited Paz Estenssoro.' Then there came asylum in the embassy, lunches in Asuncion, plans with Morinigo in Paraguay, sprees with members of the 'alliance' and plotting with the members of the wealthy Rosca in Buenos Aires.

"Meanwhile, those who could not obtain the "forgiveness" of the "chief," the reprobates, suffered. They became stevedores at the port, sewer workers...or they lived on charity, with the serpent at their throats of the anguish that burns the soul, bearing the pain of their country... Betrayal, betrayal of Villarroel ('They were the Judas' who for 30 pieces of silver from the Rosca--but perhaps more so the ambitious men and the traitors--brought Calvary and the Cross to our people, defiling the memory of its greatest son and benefactor.' Quoted in the pamphlet 'My Inofientes,' page 13).

"Came 20 November 1944. The party, but before that the entire gang, went on a war footing. The movement majority of the National Convention with PE at its head, imposed silence on the legislative branch. Whoever maintains silence, grants permission; whoever causes others to be silent, is not innocent. The result was 20 November, the outcome of the systematic preaching of hate, resentment, envy, thirst for personal vengeance of the gang. And the harvest? It was good. PE confesses it: "without 20 November..." We are the innocent, the victims of calumny. The criminals? There they are, the military. The army. Betrayal, betrayal of the army. (From 'Victor Paz Estenssoro' by Fausto Reinaga, pp 61, 62 and 63. La Paz Publishing House, S.A. 1949)."

The incredible but tragic part is that after 33 contrived events the author of the accusations himself, in a conflict-consensus strategy, repeated the same maneuvers with results which were not equal but similar. They were not equal because the time was not the same, neither were the victims and much less the people. They were similar because 60 percent of the results were favorable for him.

We explain: Victor Paz Estenssoro, the leader of the coup d'etat of General Padilla and the group then called the "institutionalists," had not achieved his objective of taking control of the government and turning it into the machinery of electoral fraud, which would have given him the victory. He gave up his intention of being proclaimed president by the legislature and supported by the most scandalous fraud in history, he allowed the immediate imposter of the Carter "democratic" game become president of the republic, entrusting General Padilla with control of the government and compliance with the Congressional Resolution dated 6 August as commander of the armed forces.

But when he confirmed the lack of influence and authority of General Padilla and his group among military personnel, he reacted immediately: He saw himself forced to work quickly when he discovered that the intentions of Dr Guevara, as his power increased, were to exclude him forever from his political plan.

While there is a technique for destroying buildings, there are also techniques for destroying states. Victor Paz Estenssoro did not have much trouble categorizing his destructive plans as the "authentic" plan, which not only sought the presentation of the third man of the "Caracas Pact" but also the facade of a truce for the virtually failed democratic process imposed from the metropolis.

He decided to use the past, which in his youth was effective. In that way, perfecting the model of 1943 and 1946, as is expressed by the historical document of the military commands published last 22 November, he erected a coupist framework in the midst of the armed forces, taking advantage of the subjective leadership of a prestigious military man and the implicit unity of the military personnel.

It could seem inexplicable that one of the favorites of Carter democracy would prepare a coup d'etat which was more military than civilian, more destructive of the process than restoring, but it must not be forgotten that the movement, although subordinate to the master plans of the State Department, has always known how to play its own cards to consolidate positions, particularly at moments when they become questionable.

In that manner, the armed forces, already irritated by the ultraleftist campaign of the legislature and the COB, and encouraged to second a change which would break up the plan to prolong the term of Guevara, who had openly violated the rules of the game, supported the coup d'etat, apparently by Col Alberto Natusch Bush. There was no specific agreement, but rather an implicit support. Otherwise, if they had known the meaning of the coup beforehand, a coup publicly headed by Col Natusch, we are sure that the armed forces would have never allowed themselves to be used in such a sordid but naive maneuver. It was sordid from the point of view of the intention of its sponsors: Paz, Bedregal, Felman, Sandoval and Ayarao; naive from the point of view that it had Col Alberto Natusch as a representative.

The Victor Paz point of view on the objective of the coup was elementary; on the other hand, the objective of Col Natusch Bush was that of making the expectations of the armed forces known, except that they were dealt with peripherally and on his own account because there was never any organizational agreement.

Specifically, the key points of the coupist plan, which Paz agreed should be commanded by Col Natush Busch, were the following:

- 1) Defenestrate the government of Dr Guevara Arze.
- 2) Obstruct every possibility of consolidation of the government of Col Natusch.
- 3) Use every means to cause bloody clashes between the sectors manipulated in representation of the people and the members of the armed forces, so as to obtain their discredit and weakening as a political power.
- 4) Make the decisions of the armed forces subject to the authority of Colonel Natusch, for which reason there should be a change in members of the High Command in order to erode the authority of Generals Padilla and Azero, who free from Paz, began to act independently and apparently in terms of institutionality, which did not suit the interests of Paz but did suit those of Guevara and Siles Suazo.
- 5) Eliminate every initiative by Colonel Natusch with respect to relations between the state and the people, their aspirations and needs, as well as in the area of the outside world.
- 6) Return to the starting point without Guevara or Natusch Busch, leaving the fate of the armed forces in the hands of the people. It would be even better if a 21 July took place.

In that situation, the justifications for the coup and particularly the program, which the government of Natusch prepared day by day in keeping with the public pulse, were of no significant value; neither were the confidential talks which the majority of the legislators had with the new chief of state, nor the warm congratulations reaching him from the various political "tents."

The talks of the International Monetary Fund representatives were of no significance and much less so were the group of propositions made by Colonel Natusch to the executive secretary of the COB, Juan Lechin Oquendo, inside one of the light tanks which repelled the attacks of the mob.

Specifically, what took place was the fulfillment of the "diabolical plan" of Dr Paz, which in the course of 16 days developed completely. Thus, Colonel Natusch became the victim of the great masquerade. On the other hand, the armed forces (the only organized, coherent and reliable thing for the country until before the coup) were left committed because of the uproar of the moment, almost incriminated and at the point of clashing among themselves and with the political hydra which sent its shock troops against the barracks to take them to the lampposts like Villarroel, in the name of the people. Only their unbreakable unity saved them, the intentions of their torturers of yesterday, today and always being thwarted.

In that respect, the defense of institutionality against the domestic and foreign conspiracy, extremism and submissiveness of the senile political parties (who enjoyed the victory which Natusch handed them on a silver platter), by the military commands headed by Gen Luis Garcia Meza, was of historical and patriotic significance.

It can be said that thanks to that military action in General Headquarters, the armed forces and the country were saved. These were on the verge of being subjected by foreign forces commanded by Sandinists and Castroites, tolerated by the pseudodemocracy of the palace, legislature and diplomats, and represented publicly by the "Karachipampa." That is why, on that morning when the new members of the military command were sworn in, the unbreakable unity of the armed forces was proclaimed in unison by all the officer corps.

The important thing, in another area, is that the framework of imposed democracy was restored to the extremes of a hoax, subject to any influence. However, it only affected the reorganization of the Executive Branch with the implementation of the Paz Estenssoro party system in the same terms made possible by the legislative fraud in an action similar to that of 6 August, but this time with complicity without exceptions.

The legislature proclaimed a new presidential appointment, which only had the merit of prolonging the rule of the party which acted as an intermediary between the imperial power and the bourgeoisie at the service of foreign interests, defeating the people, wounding the armed forces, and undermining national sovereignty. All this within an artificial climate of democracy, more simulated than real, whose white cane is a movement-oriented policy to which some of the press attributes just one merit: it has recognized its own obviousness.

In conclusion, that model was successful, but in a murderous endeavor, whose preparation could have only occurred to Victor Paz Estenssoro, tragic leader of a betrayed revolution which today is exhausted, and the main actor in a fraudulent process in every respect. Fortunately, history, even with its ups and downs, will condemn his appetites, which will be revealed by time.

VI. Five Million Victims

The rise of Col Natusch Busch indeed led to the shedding of the blood of those groups of provocateurs who tried to resist the deployment of army troops, who in good faith supported the early morning coup on 1 November in the belief that it was a strictly military political position. It turned out to be a politico-militant arrangement of which the MNR turned out to be the main legislative support. The chief of that faction, Dr Victor Paz Estenssoro, programmed it, and Guillermo Bedregal, Jose Fellman Velarde and Edil Sandoval Moron were the executors.

With civilian support and the program of the new government gone because of the betrayal of the chief of the alliance, every other attempt at survival was useless. It was then that those political leaders in the legislature committed to pseudodemocracy, encouraged by the fiction of the bravery of Dr Guevara, who presumed to call himself president in clandestinity and began to issue decrees which he had not been able to issue as the "interim constitutional" president, performing executive actions, once more made their proposals and turned out to be the "brave defenders of democracy against the Natusch coup," despite the fact that hours before they had been cleaning the access road to Quemado Palace for Colonel Natusch.

The undisussed general strike, a dying effort by the COB, the great banner of the international blockade, as well as the results of the bloody clashes, had been enough to convince many to turn their backs on the government of Colonel Natusch and to propose the reinstatement of democracy, which undoubtedly was the confirmation of Dr Guevara in government. However, despite everything that was considered in those days, while the armed forces returned to their barracks and Col Natusch Busch remained calm in the belief that the program of the "democratic coup" would be accomplished and that he would be acknowledged to be president of the republic, it was agreed among representatives of extranational powers, members of the COB and the leadership of Victor Paz, to appoint

Lidia Gueiler, the last card which represented the Paz Estenssoro leadership, as president.

As of that moment, a long period of hunger, poverty, terror, systematic deceit and a pseudodemocracy repreated in the narrow framework of a third election, was decreed.

The paradoxical thing was that all the pseudodemocratic official spokesmen launched an inordinate campaign to isolate the armed forces and to break the bonds of support they have always had with the people, although some may say the contrary. The excellent recourse used was the blame for thousand and thousands of deaths caused by the "Natusch Coup," when the truth was otherwise. It is an infamous method used many times, forgetting that the victims of the accusers of today are innumerable throughout the history of the political history of Bolivia. The day will come when the guilt of those responsible in political life will be judged and then we shall see what the truth has been.

But without going too far, because of the installation of a new government in what was called "a constitutional solution," as each and every one of the violations of the will of the people and authority by the forces located in the legislature have come to be called, the victims who today suffer hunger and fear are not 500, 1,000 or 2,000, they number five million. This means that all the people of Bolivia are suffering because of the measures of economic type applied by the present government, the result of profiteering and tricky legislative opportunistic combinations.

This means that the /diplomatic blockade/ which did not wish to recognize the government of Colonel Natusch, began to exercise its mandate in our country as an /economic blockade/.

Bolivia is a country in permanent upheaval, whose actions and reactions are translated into coups and countercoups, revolutions and counter-revolutions, which undoubtedly attract economic powers, political opportunists, persons, ideas, ideologies and positions. Thus, it is very simple to try to configure their development along the lines of the situation of the time when it has a structural characteristic. Thus, at this time, the policy of President Carter is not favored by a change in the democratism sponsored since the end of the 70's. For that reason, resorting to a number of factors, he is prepared to drown, even in blood, any uprising that will alter the course of his negotiations in Latin America. This was made clear once more by an official of the U.S. Department of State named Eaton, who arrived in Bolivia on Saturday 12 January to hold talks with government authorities. His spokesman, Juan Lechin Oquendo, told the press that Eaton had told him that the government and people of the United States did not recognize any new coup d'etat in Bolivia. The diplomatic blockade, which apparently suffocated the rise of Colonel Natusch to power and had the Andean Pact as its main instrument, has been the best strategy used in this respect.

Here in this country, the power groups affiliated with the Carter line did not have much trouble in destroying the pretensions of Colonel Natusch Busch. The international aspect, the economic resources of the nonstate mining interests, their vast influence in the legislature and the service of the "Third World sector" situated in the principal mechanisms of the mass media, did the rest. The strange thing is that the ultraleft itself, which knew very well that reaction against the coup was not in response to a revolutionary position but to an imperialist one, finally seconded the solution of the problem in the terms suggested by Victor Paz Estenssoro, who in that victory had a glimpse of his own triumph.

In this way, that diplomatic blockade became an /economic blockade/, against which no force has used its power in an attempt to make national self-determination prevail. That pragmatic, antinational and alienating position caused the legislature, the multiparty system and all the mechanism which have been responsible for the return of pseudodemocracy, forgetting the real revolutionary and truly democratic manifestations, to tolerate the leadership by that /economic blockade/ in exchange for being able to keep their seats and the central government.

That is how, in the name of democratization, in the name of the people whose will was used without prior or subsequent consultation, in the name of a what is a puppet government in every aspect, the measures imposed by the /International Monetary Fund/ were dictated. /Measures which decreed misery and hunger for 5 million inhabitants. A good democracy for an economic policy contrary to the interests of the people./

The tragic part of this neocolonial and undemocratic game is that in order to curb the real reaction of the Bolivian people, a cowardly, humiliating and alienated strategem was put into play. The COB was the main instrument of this fiction. In the name of the peasantry, vanguard groups were formed to feign a popular opposition against the economic measures, blocking roads used by the real peasants in the past. In that manner the people and all the civic and trade union institutions lost the use of their own resources, because the blockade, instead of being the weapon of intimidation of the government, was the instrument for isolating the people themselves in such a way that while the people began to mobilize to provide themselves with food, they lost sight of the basic problem. With the popular forces, finally exhausted by the great contradictions they faced, Juan Lechin Oquendo, in the name of the peasants, signed the agreement between the government and his COB leadership for lifting the blockade. /Certainly no one in Bolivia will ever forget this new betrayal of the people, the working class, the peasants, and his own revolutionaries by Juan Lechin,/ the ones to whom he always turned to maintain his control. There was only one thing different in that event: the majority of the Bolivian peasants sincerely participated in the blockades. When the order to halt that coercive measure was given,

the blockades continued and were only defeated by weariness and official pressure, although they had the conviction that Bolivia had been defeated by the international /economic blockade/ its lackeys in the government, the COB and the Paz Estenssoro-Guevara legislature. It is possible that in the context of all these factors, the "Third World" agents, foreigners from the Evangelic and Catholic Churches and from social and cultural welfare organizations, received diplomas of distinction for their great task of destroying the soul and institutions of Bolivia.

Today, the international economic blockade exerts a powerful influence through the Andean Pact. Hunger has taken over the country. There is no bread, there is no meat, there is nothing for the poor man of the country. Only the groups with political power and economic control have not suffered any ill effects from the economic and political changes. Confusing the /status quo/ with democracy, they are willing to tolerate a fixed round in the electoral game.

Scientific tradition establishes that studies on the living conditions of people should be based on their "normal" years, selected in such a way that "conflicts" or "disturbances," do not make their effects felt. To abide by that equitative rule, we would have to take the typical standard of the "Banzer Dictatorship," as opposed to this period of what is called democracy.

Living conditions at present are those of a desperate poverty of the national masses and of a lack of courage for confronting the structural problems of the country. Imposed economic conditions and their anti-body, the "economic plan" of the COB, without any value because of the foregoing /do not represent the courage for confronting reality, but rather the betrayal of imposing them in the name of democracy./ It is within this pseudocontext that the imperialist mandates are completely obeyed by the meekness and the opportunism of the multiparty system headed by Paz Estenssoro, who rather than lose the government he wants for unconfessed purposes, preferred the alternative /even though five million human beings were left in the grip of hunger and exploitation./

Bolivia has a bankrupt national state enterprise, an immense rural area reduced to the greatest poverty recorded in the past 28 years, an unemployment which reaches five percent of the labor force, without taking into consideration the great mass of the under employed. There is a lack of housing, shelter and education for the great mass of city dwellers, death and disease assail the working people, an inflationary process reduces general improvement of life, and an increase in the cost of living, which is greatly out of step with the freezing of wages and salaries because the increases established by the economic modification have made them of no value, particularly at the present time, and their buying power is minimum.

To alleviate the sad situation of the state, the IMF is only going to provide \$65 million of the \$120 million promised for increasing the standby. In exchange, the present government has promised the IMF that it will begin a greater devaluation of our money until April of the current year. In all the other areas of the economy, all the cooperation promised is far off, therefore, the /economic blockade/ of the metropolis is a reality caused by the political submissiveness of the leaders of the fraudulent democratism.

This brief description, however, does not provide a complete knowledge of the socioeconomic reality of the country because it does not deal with the mechanisms and instruments from the academic or technical point of view, but rather it deals with the hunger of the people, the sorrow of the country, the lack of perspective in the steering of the ship of state.

Imperialism, which for a long time has used the parties--yesterday revolutionaries and reactionaries today--today, with greater effectiveness in that very attractive area of the democratic situation, uses human rights and individual freedoms, however, we are much worse off than in the recent past. This does not prevent the economic agencies of free enterprise, foreign or national, from continuing their upward climb in the acquisition of wealth at the EXPENSE OF THE PEOPLE. The equation used by the privileged is very simple: the longer pseudodemocratism lasts and the greater the extermination of the national forces is, the fewer will be the obligations to the state and the more Bolivian currency for each dollar and more profits there will be for the figureheads. Hate is sown among the people of Bolivia and a furrow filled with blood is opened between the armed forces and the people so that their unity will not be a curb to the looting of the country nor to the enjoyment of being in government by the unscrupulous men of the time. Also, in the degree in which calm, meekness and conformity overcomes the majority, terror sown in the rural area is now directed toward the cities as the final solution for the struggle between the active forces of the country and those of an antinational nature.

This new tragedy of the Bolivian people, will perhaps one day reach the nation of Abraham Lincoln and ask for an accounting from those officials who exert pressure on these countries of South America. Perhaps the day will come when the North American people will know the policy of terror, hunger and destruction sown by their leaders in their attempts to serve interests alien to the ideals of universal brotherhood.

Meanwhile, the struggle will continue here without retreats against the fraud and violence of the dictators of financial imperialism, who manage their interests through the leaders of the pseudodemocratic democracy.

As the first step in this task, there is nothing better than to reveal all this series of injustices and violation of the national will. Such is the last case of the strategem used by the present representatives of a certain political order. In their objective of healing the fissures shown by the plan imposed from beyond the Rio Bravo, they have committed a new outrage against national sovereignty.

While it is true that the coup d'etat by Natusch was based on false foundations, it is no less true that it has shown itself to be positive since it reveals the fraudulent nature of the pseudodemocratic process.

At this time, the electoral machinery for prolonging the existence of pseudodemocracy in Bolivia is being readied once more on the basis of the betrayal of the working class and the peasants, on the basis of the defeat of the Bolivian people, humiliating the nation with the farce of the integrationist policy, which is only the baton of command of the multinationals, who are attempting to insure economic interests alien to the countries in the Andean Pact.

If the word "democracy" means something, it would be the exercise of government in accordance with the will of the people. Wherever the government does not represent that will, there can be no democracy but rather a grotesque imitation. On the other hand, if the will of the people cannot be expressed in a chemically pure or direct manner, but rather by representatives, then the democratic truth will depend on the truth of the representatives. Therefore, there where the representative principle is subject to limitations, restrictions and mutilations, democracy becomes an undeniable fiction of empty words, a bitter reality of despotism, usurpation and lies. At this moment, riding on the backs of /five million human beings harassed by poverty and hunger/, the multiparty system orchestrated by ambitious but wholehearted servants of the antinational sector, is committing the most flagrant violations of the Political Constitution of the State.

The main ones are:

1. The appointment of the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Lidia Gueiler as the interim constitutional president of the republic, in a replay of the act of appointing the previous president, Dr Walter Guevara. The aggravating factor about the latest appointment is that the legislature which appointed the president had ceased to exist when it participated in the coup d'etat and recognized the government of Colonel Natusch. Eight of the ministers of state who swore Lidia Gueiler in were members of the team which led the seditious operations.
2. Approval of the economic package imposed by the IMF in flagrant violation of national sovereignty.

3. The signing of agreements in the Andean Pact in the name of the country, violating our sovereignty, self-determination, and the dear desires for a maritime solution, in exchange for international political support for the existing regime.

4. The appointment of the Supreme Court of Justice.

5. The operation, without a solution of continuity, of the two legislative chambers, the legal activity of Congress having ended.

6. With the rejection of the political fronts, in the name of which the electoral court recognized the mandate of the deputies and senators who were their candidates, not as candidates but as representatives of those political organizations, those people have continued to legislate, not as representatives of those political groups but on a personal basis, violating Article 61 of the Political Constitution.

7. By having resolved that the Executive Branch call for general elections, the Congress has resigned its mandate and in compliance with Article 60 of the Political Constitution, it should have ceased to function. However, it continues to function, legislating as if had never ceased in its functions.

Truly, the pseudodemocratic ~~democratism~~ of an artificial, obsolete and antinational multiparty system having failed in elections because of fraud in the government, because of its betrayal of the people and because it violated all legal standards, has reached its end. However, usurping the popular will, attacking institutions and corrupting the Political Constitution, it continues its task of prolonging itself in violation of democratic principles. In that respect, the legislature is the best instrument, and it has been that since the first day of its operation, serving only for the trampling of the Great Charter, designating the "interim constitutional" presidents, and being paid juicy salaries. The moral, intellectual, political and legislative quality of its members is like those of the 1872 Assembly, of whom General Morales said when he closed it down: .../" a gang of traitors, blackguards, men who have sold out, who far from performing their mission have abused their power and authority (...). It is they who have brought misfortune to these poor people, more than any other called upon to be great and who today find themselves in poverty, covered with tatters and miseries."/

Their last act is the new call for general elections. The decision is accompanied by a troupe of candidates who aspire to power, depending on how submissive they are to the owners of the "little machine." All of them, forgetting their failures and the tragic socioeconomic picture of the country, demand new elections, demand just elections, with which they hope to restore that fraudulent pseudodemocracy, the usurper

of the will, which they have debased until they have made of it a great hypocrisy, speaking of freedom to a people beset by exploitation, poverty, hunger, corruption, betrayal and venality.

What to do?

As can be understood from all that has been said, our country at this time is undergoing one of its crudest tragedies despite the fact that the people have subordinate~~t~~ their personal needs to national actions. Anarchy is yielding its fruits by disorganizing production and paralyzing the development of the country. For three years the pulse of the country has been stopped. The domestic imbalance caused by the deficit in the state sector is becoming worse because of excessive spending in operations and not in investments by an also excessive number of unnecessary and unproductive bureaucrats.

What to do under conditions so critical for the national economy? Undeniably, the national revolution of the 50's was aimed at accomplishing specific tasks within the framework of national liberation, the only option for countries such as ours, domestically exploited by the oligarchic and large landowning classes and by monopolistic imperialism abroad. But everything stopped at petitions supported by the people, petitions begging for social changes and opportunities for participating in national democratization and independence. Their impotence reached such contradictory extremes that the people have become exhausted; thus, it has been confirmed historically that the MNR in its dualistic manifestations and opportunistic ramifications; politically speaking, no longer has anything to do in the process and its struggle to emerge is artificial and oriented against the national interests, and every day that goes by it becomes one of the most antipopular and antihistoric options. It could be said that the new electoral phase of democratization in the manner dictated by the Carter administration and the Trilateral Commission which handles the world of the multinationals, rather than an opportunity is the opportunistic cover aimed at breaking the real democratic framework in which only the people should have the right to speak and no one else. This is what experience teaches. The national revolution began with the waving of anti-imperialist and national liberation banners, but afterward it has concluded by surrendering to the foreign oppressor, a situation which today forces the destruction of any popular movement whether it be of peasants, workers, middle class, professionals, educators, military, or intellectuals, because it is a danger to its alienating designs, today characterized by the organization of a State of Law, the servant of the metropolitan interests and those of its intermediaries.

What to do under such contradictory conditions?

The national revolution, which still supports the party system led by Paz Estenssoro, to whom the other parties are subordinating themselves today so as not to lose their last resort of preservation which could lead them to the enjoyment of power, is no longer an option. It is an obstacle and a bridgehead of overseas neocolonialism. In order to reinitiate its liberation in a front led by all the people, Bolivia would first have to win the battles of mental liberation because proposed political changes for democratization are of no use without the control of its own national destiny; because there is no socioeconomic change if it is not within the context of self-sufficiency, self-management and self-determination.

Since the political and economic structures developed after the national action of April 1952 have become unfair and neocolonialist, concentrating social, economic and political power in the hands of the privileged minorities of the nonnationalized mining industry and others who have real control of power, it is inferred that the essential condition for the operational feasibility of a new socioeconomic order would be the revision of the living conditions of the people and of the prospects of Bolivia as a free and independent nation.

The governing of a country is not a task for one man alone, or a certain government. It is the task of the country itself because the adequate evaluation of national objectives and the means for attaining them are truly the responsibility of political and social groups of a great consensus. In that respect, every democratizing proposition should be of that type so that all the members of the country can cooperate fully in the process of change. For that reason, we believe that our aspirations in the PUEBLO group reside basically in covering all the aspects which involve the development of the nation.

We have the firm conviction that the government leader or leaders should not set a single objective for themselves. The basic mission of the one, or the ones who govern, and given the situation of crisis in which the republic finds itself, is to delineate parallel courses of action which would lead us to a consolidation of the genuine and liberating democratic processes of the country, at the same time overcoming the acute economic and social situation which affects the people and the state.

It requires no great effort to understand that in a country such as ours there is need for a change in structure by democratic and liberating means; a change which will overthrow the power of the imperialist monopolies and that of the domestic economic power groups which serve the Yankees or the Russians indiscriminately, in order to resolve all our problems which block the paths of national independence.

And let it not be said that it is an "extremist" position. In the most general terms, the solution to the problem of our production consists of breaking the vicious circle of poverty and of inverting the aspect of a cyclical and accumulative process so as to enter into the phase of a sustained process. It is a generalization, but a correct one, which only requires being put into effect.

For this, the destiny and greatness of our country should be placed above and beyond political passions and sectarianisms, which in the course of history have caused deep wounds, damaging the stability and security of the national community.

In view of that unavoidable reality and in view of events which could cause a dangerous social disintegration, the people of Bolivia, particularly the armed forces, should support the laws of the country and comply with the substantive tasks entrusted to them by civic responsibilities in circumstances under which the people advocate a system of complete liberation from the constraints of dependence which restrict the development and the very life of the nation.

While all of us wanted to join in a framework of political democratization, no one has been able to deny that its implementation through the constitutionalization of the government has failed. The people of Bolivia, who twice in succession have been made responsible for a constitutionizing fiction of the powers of the state, have practically refrained from becoming involved in such costly masquerades in which the great actors, the people and the armed forces, were left completely disillusioned by the miserable actions of the political parties in competition. Today, with real conviction, we can declare, because we have confirmed this to be so, that they are sectors lacking popular support, who struggle to gain control of the government for themselves and to convert it, as they are already doing, into the foundation for an electoral fraud.

In that respect, as part of the national community, in our status as members of one of the guardian institutions of the country, in the role assigned to us by history, we proclaim that there are only two ways to struggle for the democratization and liberation of Bolivia:

- 1) General elections with participation by all the people of Bolivia, held by an impartial government, and in which the present promoters of chaos would have no part.
- 2) The transformation of the material and spiritual structures of our country so that the nation can once more find its true destiny, which must be the destiny of its people, its armed forces, the sacred objectives contained in our maritime claims and collective welfare without masters or slavedrivers, whether they be from the West or the East, because Bolivia is above and beyond both international realities.

In compliance with the mission we have assigned ourselves, we are in conditions to mobilize all true Bolivians so that one or another form of solution to the great national problem characterized by anarchy, disorder, poverty, paralyzed production, infiltration of unspeakable groups, who chorus treason and ideological terrorism and the prevalence of personal ambition and public immorality, may prosper.

We make a fervent and sincere appeal to the various groups which make up the national community to ask them to advocate democratization without fraud or a change in structures because only one of those positions can lead to the real unification which will respond to the true aspirations of the people and the interests of the nation.

True Bolivian political parties, peasants, workers, businessmen, industrialists, merchants, manufacturers; civic, professional, scientific, and religious associations, police forces, professional educators, students, the news media, housewives, in short, all Bolivians, should participate in this vigorous movement, which in the final analysis, will in practice lead us to a true and effective democracy with the involvement of all; with bread, shelter, decent housing and a country.

To our comrades in arms of the three branches we say that this position we have adopted is part of the new policy we must observe in military circles. No more paternalism by an irresponsible military chief without a doctrine or love for the country.

Enough of those who have served interests which sometimes have been ultrarightist and other times ultraleftist. We want to serve the people and our discredited institution. The salary of an officer, the salary of a sergeant, the salary of a military commander, just as that of the general public, is the lowest and most humiliating. In Bolivia it is said that everyone has rights but everyone wants to take away the rights of the military, including a human rights. The housing of a military man, the housing of a warrant officer, the housing of a military chief without influence, is so indecent that it violates the human condition. And yet there is talk of shutting us up in our barracks or of sending us to frontiers as if we were the dregs of society, while those who rob the national treasury and those who work against the nation, parade their shamelessness through the streets of the country. That cannot be. The Bolivian military man should and must occupy his true place in society, particularly in political society. The armed forces of Bolivia cannot be the servants nor the protection of the shameful party system which today pretends to be democratic. The armed forces throughout history, and as long as they have not been influenced by oligarchic, unpatriotic and imperialistic ambitions, have proved their clean and pure revolutionary inclinations with outstanding performances and have demonstrated that they are the most solid, coherent and disciplined institution capable of guiding the destinies of the country. Today more than ever, they are forces on the rise, capable of offering the people a clear and progressive future.

That is why we speak now because we are going outside the rules of ~~our~~ institution. And all the comrades of Bolivia, the commanders, officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers must take note of our propositions. We require that Bolivia recover from the serious moral, political, economic and social crisis in which it finds itself mired because of the faults of the adventurers and imperialist powers. All of them in Bolivia has talked until they are tired; all have lied to satiety. Now it is the turn of youth to speak, they who are not committed to the party system, which usurps the people's will, nor to foreign powers, Soviet or North American; and together with that pure youth, it is our turn to speak.

Comrades, listen to our proposals, which are the solution of the serious problem of Bolivia, our beautiful and beloved country. You must support us because the people are with us, because the Bolivian workers are with us, because the Bolivian peasants are with us. No one must forget that the salvation of Bolivia shall be our work and not that of false prophets. Long live free and sovereign Bolivia! Long live democracy with the people! Down with the imperialisms of Moscow and the United States! La Paz, January 1980. PUEBLO National Public Health Committee, consisting of officers and noncommissioned officers of the glorious army of Bolivia. Written in the General Headquarters of the armed forces of the nation.

8908
CSO: 3010

COMMENTARY ON USSR 'ASSISTANCE' TO AFGHANISTAN PUBLISHED

Havana JUVENTUD REBELDE in Spanish 14 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by Eduardo Vergara: "Pharisaism of an Old Aggressor"]

[Text] The most reactionary and warmongering circles in the United States who already openly enjoy the approval and support of the American President insist on accusing the Soviet Union of intervention because it has fulfilled a basic principle of its foreign policy--acceding to Afghanistan's request for assistance before the danger of seeing itself invaded.

In recent statements made to PRAVDA by Leonid Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was categorical: "The moment has arrived when the Soviet Union could not help but respond to the request of the Afghan Government. To proceed otherwise would have meant handing over free Afghanistan to imperialism and allowing a repetition of the Chilean situation where the freedom of the people was drowned in blood."

Brezhnev added that on repeated occasions Afghanistan sought help from the Soviet Union, while President Mohammad Taraki was still alive and after that. Brezhnev made it very clear that the USSR warned those involved that if the aggression did not stop, Afghanistan would not be left alone to its fate "and as is known the word of the USSR does not diverge from deeds."

What did the United States respond to this?

In a speech he delivered last night Jimmy Carter again accused the Soviet Union of "terrorist intervention" and warned that normal commercial relations between the two countries would not be renewed in the near future. In the next few hours Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher set off on a tour of Britain, France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany so that these governments should also take part in the commercial embargo measures including, among others, the boycott of the Moscow Olympics.

So far these have been the more or less immediate plans of the United States.

But it would be appropriate to wonder whether the United States President does not recall or whether there is not someone who could remind him of the outrages perpetrated by his "great country" in the last few years?

Did he forget the United States invasion thousands of kilometers from its shores in one of the dirtiest pages of history when it occupied the south of the territory of Vietnam with more than half a million men endowed with the most sophisticated equipment?

Did he forget the invasion against the people of Santo Domingo who had wished to avail themselves of their options to change the history of dependency and abuses to which they had been subjected by the investment of United States capital in the first place?

Did he forget the invasion which the CIA organized, financed, trained, and carried out on Playa Giron in an attempt to halt the course of our socialist revolution?

Did he forget the invasion of Guatemala? Did he forget that Panama still feels the burden of U.S. intervention on a portion of its territory? Did he forget that the people of Nicaragua were bled by Yankee intervention which supported the Somoza dynasty for more than 40 years? Does he forget that Puerto Rico is a United States colony, an issue recognized by the United Nations, and that its people are prevented from following their destiny in the form that they deem appropriate.

It is not precisely the United States and President Carter who have the moral right to hurl such lies at the Soviet Union. Please, gentlemen, have some shame and some honor!

2662
CSO: 3010

CONTACTS REPORTED WITH DUTCH, DOMINICANS, SAHARANS, U.S.

Low Countries Communist Delegation

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 21 Jan 80 p 8

[Text] Henk Hoekstra, president of the Dutch Communist Party, and Jan de Boo, secretary of international relations, visited our country from 10 January to 18 January 1980 by invitation of the CC [Central Committee] of the PCC [Communist Party of Cuba].

Commander in Chief Fidel Castro, first secretary of the CC of the PCC, held a fraternal meeting with the delegation, discussing aspects of mutual interest to the two parties.

The friendly talks between the two parties were presided over by Pedro Miret Prieto, member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the PCC, and included: Jesus Montane, member of the CC and chief of its Foreign Relations Department; Javier Ardizones, section chief; and Silvia Nereida Perez, an official of that department.

The talks emphasized the objective that this visit contribute to the development of fraternal relations between the two parties and the realization in the future of joint actions in favor of detente and disarmament, world peace, the underdeveloped countries' aspirations for a better future, elimination of the results of colonialism and neocolonialism, neutralization of the effects of anticomunism and actions of solidarity with those who fight for liberation, development and the well-being of their peoples--in other words, with those who fight for the rights of mankind.

During the fraternal talks, both parties reported on the activities that each is doing to strengthen the international communist movement.

Both parties agreed on the need to fight against the recent steps taken by the most reactionary forces of imperialism to make mankind return to the "Cold War" through the renewed arms race which the

United States and its NATO allies are again accelerating by the decision to produce and place new missiles in Europe.

The representatives of the PCC recognized the great battle fought by the Dutch Communist Party to prevent the manufacture of the neutron bomb and the most recent initiative to place atomic missiles on Dutch soil. They also recognized all the efforts made, particularly the mass actions, so that the effects of the economic, political and social crisis provoked by the mere existence of the capitalist system would not fall on the shoulders of the working class.

The PCC representatives also pointed out the consistent fight of the Dutch Communist Party for the working class in its country during its 61 years of existence. The PCC congratulated it for the successes achieved until now in the fulfillment of the agreements of its 26th Congress and in the strengthening of the line approved at that important congress.

The representatives of the Dutch Communist Party expressed the Dutch communists' and workers' fraternal feelings of solidarity toward the Cuban revolution and their pleasure in the successes our people have achieved in the construction of a socialist society. They also noted the deserved international prestige of our country for the solidarity that it has shown in its actions to help the peoples who fight for their freedom and development.

The importance of the success of the Sixth Summit of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries and the election of Fidel Castro Ruz as president of that movement were also pointed out.

The Dutch Communist Party supports the universal demand for the end of the illegal U.S. blockade that has continued for many years against the Cuban people and the return of the U.S. military base in Guantanamo and the territory that it occupies to the Cuban nation.

The representatives of both parties repeated their firm support for the fight for peace and detente and expressed their solidarity with the national liberation movements and the fight of the peoples against colonial and neocolonial domination and every form of racial discrimination.

There was also complete agreement in condemning the persistent deflection of material and human resources to the arms race in a world where poverty increases every day. This is a criminal waste and further endangers peace.

Both parties pointed out the imperative need to fight for the implementation of a development program for the underdeveloped countries of the world. The Dutch Communist Party expressed its support for

Fidel Castro's UN proposal to allocate at least \$300 billion in financial and material resources and technical assistance for the underdeveloped countries.

The Dutch Communist Party stressed the unity and solidarity needed between the working class in the developed capitalist countries and the workers of the underdeveloped countries as an indispensable condition for victory over the common enemy of the peoples.

Both parties emphasized that the possibility of development of the economies of underdeveloped countries through industrialization is presented as the only alternative so that the economies of developed capitalist countries, submerged today in worsening stagnation and inflation, can avoid the constant recession to which they are condemned.

The talks were held in a very fraternal atmosphere. There was discussion of matters in which there is general agreement by both parties. They also established the basis for a systematic exchange of ideas and activities in the future.

Dominican Delegation Make-up Listed

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 21 Jan 80 p 3

[Text] Havana (AIN)--A Dominican delegation of senators and deputies headed by Juan Rafael Peralta Perez, Senate president and leader of the PR [Reformist Party] in that country, visited the Museum of the Revolution and the Granma Memorial in this capital.

Earlier it toured the Alamar district and the Palacio de los Pioneros in the outskirts of this capital.

Deputy Dalia Aleli Garcia and Rafael Hernandez, second chief of the International Relations Department of the ANPP [National People's Government Assembly], accompanied the delegation.

The group of senators and deputies from different political parties in the Dominican Republic arrived on Friday at the invitation of the ANPP.

The group also includes: Felipe S. Parra Pagan and Ramon E. Fernandez Brandel, senators from the PR; and Manuel Rodriguez Fernandez, Jacobo Sanchez Jose and Alfonso Canto Dinzey from the PRD [Dominican Revolutionary Party].

Deputies Donato Fernandez, Rafael E. Valera Benitez, Victor R. Fumert Uribe, Enilda C. Polanco de Grullon, Fulgencio Espinal Tejeda and Roberto Jimenez also belong to the PRD.

Deputies Juan V. Sanchez, Elsa Lidia Feliz de Sanchez, Leonidas Sen-
cion Reyes, Carlos M. Quezada Duran and Ana Valentina Feliz Roa are
members of the PR.

Maria Altagracia Rojas, wife of deputy Roberto Jimenez, and Clodo-
milo Moquete, journalist for LA NOTICIA, accompanied them.

Deputy Guido D'Alessandro Tavarez from the MAS [Social Action Move-
ment] is also a member of the delegation.

Fulgencio Espinal Tejeda is the spokesman for the PRD group of
deputies.

The delegation will remain here until 25 January. During that per-
iod, it will tour different historic, recreational and production
centers.

Jose Aranaburo, secretary of the ANPP, welcomed the Dominican con-
gressmen at the airport. He was accompanied by: Lourdes Urrutia,
chief of the Internat...l Relations Department of the ANPP; Rafael
Hernandez; and deput...lia Aleli Garcia.

Relations With Saharan People

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 22 Jan 80 p 5

[Article by Ramon Martinez for PRENSA LATINA: "Cuban Political,
Fraternal Recognition of Heroic Saharan People Consolidated"]

[Text] The Cuban Government's decision to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with the RASD [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] consolidated
Cuban political and fraternal recognition of the heroic Saharan
people.

Cuba became the 35th country to officially recognize the RASD, a
country that rose up in arms in 1973 to defend its territory from
foreign occupation, led by the only representative of that desert
people, the Polisario Front.

The RASD has already received recognition from 20 African countries,
9 Latin American countries and 6 Asian ones.

In 1977 a Cuban delegation headed by Armando Acosta, member of the
CC of the PCC, visited the Saharan desert. It had been invited to
the celebration of the fourth anniversary of the beginning of the
armed struggle in that territory.

That same year Bachir Mustafa Sayed, adjunct secretary general of
the Polisario Front, made his first trip to Cuba and met with the
chairman of the Councils of State and Ministers, Fidel Castro.

On 21 June 1977 the Polisario Front delegation led by Sayed held its first round of talks with representatives of the PCC. The Saharans witnessed the warm solidarity of the Cuban people, government and party.

Sayed returned to Cuba in 1978 and twice in 1979. On his last stay in Havana, he said that it had special significance for him since it came at a time when the support and solidarity for his cause, always present in the PCC, were increasing throughout the world.

The Polisario Front has had a permanent delegation in Cuba for several years. It is headed by Bulahe Mohamed Fadel, member of the Political Bureau of that organization.

Cuban recognition of the RASD, like that of the other 34 countries, is not only an act of protocol but also evidence of the feeling of progressive men against anachronistic colonialist and neocolonialist systems and other forms of oppression. It is also a demonstration of support for the Saharan fight, according to accredited diplomats in Havana.

In his opening speech at the Sixth Summit of the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, Fidel Castro, its president, considered the Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara absolutely unwarranted.

He said that the Saharan people's aspiration to free self-determination is unquestionably just and that Cuba, as part of the UN committee that investigated the aspirations of that people before the conflict, could verify that 99 percent of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara wanted independence.

Paragraphs 96 to 98 of the Final Declaration of the Havana summit also expressed deep concern for the serious situation prevailing in the Western Sahara.

It also denounced the fact that the decolonization process in that territory had not been carried out in accord with the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the decisions of the OAU.

U.S. Educators' Delegation

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 22 Jan 80 p 2

[Text] Havana (AIN)--A delegation of the U.S. National Educators Association headed by its president, Willard McGuire, arrived here yesterday afternoon, invited by the CTC [Central Organization of Cuban Trade Unions].

The delegation includes: Terry Herdon, secretary general of the association; Patsy Estrella, council member; and Braudilio Alonso, a member.

The group which will stay in Cuba for a week was welcomed at the Jose Marti International Airport by Rosario Fernandez, member of the National Secretariat of the CTC.

Others present included: Julio Reyes, secretary general of the National Union of Education and Science Workers; Antonio Lopez, member of the National Executive Committee of the CTC; and Enrique Peralta, an official.

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CSO: 3010

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

CDE MAKES PLANS TO INCREASE ELECTRIC ENERGY OUTPUT

Repairs, New Construction

Santo Domingo LISTIN DIARIO in Spanish 9 Jan 80 pp 1, 16

[Article by Santiago Estrella Veloz]

[Text] The CDE [Dominican Electric Corporation] increased its energy output by 10,000 kilowatts when, 2 nights ago, it managed to synchronize Haina unit number 5, which had been out of service for 3 years.

The CDE administrator, engineer Guillermo Paniagua, said current energy production is about 372,000 kilowatts.

Paniagua also stated that the Valdesia Dam, which was seriously damaged by Hurricane David more than 4 months ago, has been repaired and will go into operation next Saturday the 12th.

The floodgates and the enginehouse of the above-mentioned reservoir suffered damages estimated at 2.5 millions. Its generating capacity is about 50,000 kilowatts.

The equipment has been checked with satisfactory results and, it is hoped, will become part of the system on Saturday.

Paniagua said that, initially Valdesia will be servicing the southern region of the country, where there is an energy rationing program in effect. He added that later on "a continuous uninterrupted service" will be offered.

"This represents substantial savings in the utilization of the Barahona gas plant," the CDE administrator added.

On another subject Paniagua said that in order to start working on the Itabo electric plant, they are only waiting for congress to approve the loan contract with the Spanish Foreign Bank. It could amount to as much as \$90 million. He explained that only 64 millions would be used for the plant itself. The plant would generate 125,000 kilowatts. Its construction would take 3 years.

Paniagua stated that construction continues on Haina plant no 5, which is exactly like numbers 3 and 4. It will cost some \$36 million and will generate 84,500 kilowatts. Construction was started over 5 months ago by General Electric.

The plant brought in the Virgin Islands will finally cost some \$18 million, and is being installed in Puerto Plata. It will generate 32,000 kilowatts, but is being modified to produce 35,000 with more efficient fuel consumption. Hopefully, it will be set in operation within the next 14 months, Paniagua said.

Response to Criticism

Santo Domingo LISTIN DIARIO in Spanish 9 Jan 80 p 13

[Article by Santiago Estrella Veloz]

[Text] Yesterday, CDE's assistant administrator and its director of engineering responded to criticism made the day before by a former operations superintendent of the enterprise, who warned of the need to establish protectors in the 138,000-volt Santo Domingo-Santiago power line.

Engineers Emilio Bodden and Gustavo Alba said that the aforementioned line is only being operated at 69,000 volts, so "it has appropriate protection."

"This is so true that the line operated in this form has become the safest power transmission line between Santo Domingo and Santiago," they said.

The warnings about the need for installing appropriate protectors in this line were made by engineer Carlos Guillen Mera, who observed that the blackouts will continue until this is done.

Bodden and Alba said that this new power transmission line was chosen because the previous one resulted in substantial losses and was less efficient.

"If by protectors we are to understand substations, we can say that one of the first decisions of this administration was to order equipment for the substations of Canabacoa (Santiago), Palamara (Santo Domingo) and San Pedro de Macoris," they pointed out.

They explained that this equipment, which costs approximately \$5 million, is currently under production. It is hoped they will be completed before the end of this year. Final installation will cost almost 1 million pesos.

About Guillen Mera's statement that power losses in the Santo Domingo network is about 30 percent, the technicians said: "It is true there are significant power losses, but no on the order of 30 percent."

They pointed out that in mid-February a group of six Japanese experts will arrive in the country precisely to study the Santo Domingo distribution network with the aim of improving it. This will be collaboration from the Japanese Government.

In relation to another suggestion from Guillen Mera that "linemen" be trained to work "hot lines," that is, without cutting off power while they are working, engineers Bodden and Alba said that the VDE currently "has problems which take priority over this one."

They pointed out that in the past the CDE had equipment to carry out this type of training, which was discontinued "precisely because there were other priorities."

They described as "absurd and incomprehensible" Guillen Mera's idea that the CDE acquire two mobile 5,000-kilowatt emergency plants to be connected to the system in those areas where there is damage and repairs are necessary, so that service will not be interrupted.

"If the lines are damaged, how could we load them? In this case, we could use the network power. The truth is we do not understand what he means by this absurd idea," agreed the CDE officials responding to Guillen Mera.

Purchases and Expansion Planned

Santo Domingo LISTIN DIARIO in Spanish 9 Jan 80 p 13

[Article by Santiago Estrella Veloz]

[Text] CDE administrator, engineer Guillermo Paniagua, said yesterday that the organization soon plans to purchase two 26,000-kilowatt gas turbines to be installed at the Los Minas extension.

The equipment will be bought from the Italian enterprise Fiat Marelli with government funds. The investment will be about 10 million pesos. Paniagua said the power plants will take 5 months to install once they are purchased.

In addition, the CDE, together with the French company Sofrelec, is studying the possibility of using coal in future plants called for by the state corporation's expansion plans.

Be that as it may, Paniagua said, coal could probably be obtained in the country (which is said to have significant reserves, but is still being analyzed by Mines) and would provide a more stable and cheap supply of fuel than petroleum.

Paniagua said that the CDE has applied for a loan of 6 million pesos from the Reserve Bank "to immediately start" the hydroelectric projects of Rio Blanco (Bonao) and the Lopez equalizing reservoir in the Tavera dam.

The Rio Blanco project will be exclusively for the production of energy. It will have an installed capacity of 25,000 kilowatts and could cost as much as 25 million pesos. Financing is being negotiated with the World Bank.

The Lopez equalizing reservoir will allow maximum utilization of the Tavera dam's 80,000 installed kilowatts and, in addition, will regulate discharge for adequate irrigation usage through a system of canals to be constructed in the area served by Rio Yaque del Norte. It will also have basic 9,000-kilowatt turbines.

Paniagua explained that part of the 6 million pesos requested from the Reserve Bank will be used for feasibility studies and design of eight hydroelectric projects in Alto Yaque del Norte and Alto Bao, where there is an unexploited potential of 250,000 kilowatts.

Other sums will be used in the three projects of Alto Yaque del Sur, having a 100,000-kilowatt potential, Paniagua concluded.

National Power Generation as of Yesterday

	<u>Kilowatts</u>
Haina 3 and 4 Thermolectric Plants	140,000
Haina 1	50,000
Haina 2	45,000
Santo Domingo Number 8	20,000
Santo Domingo Number 6	10,000
Santo Domingo Number 5	10,000
Timbeque 1 and 2	32,000
Weber Floating Power Plant (SPM)	7,000
Puerto Plata Power Plant	20,000
Rincon Reservoir	8,000
Santiago Diesel Units	5,000
Barahona Unit	20,000
Las Damas Hydroelectric Plant	5,000
	<u>Kilowatts</u>
	372,000

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CSO: 3010

EL SALVADOR

POP ISSUES COMMUNIQUE ON SITUATION IN NATION

San Salvador LA PRENSA GRAFICA in Spanish 24 Jan 80 p 28

[Text] Because of the crisis in our country, the POP [Popular Orientation Party] feels it is imperative to make its voice heard in order to insert a little clarity in this confusion and to combine wills and efforts to peacefully resolve the problems that afflict the republic.

The anguishing situation of our people forces all the sectors in the country to participate sincerely and patriotically in the noble effort to find the road to peace, freedom, social harmony and progress. It also obliges the armed forces--the depository of political power due to the circumstances--to unselfishly and without discrimination invite prominent people from all sectors, as long as they accept peace as the premise, to form a new government. Through its broad base and extensive support, it can be a good solution to the historic crisis that we confront.

It is not the time for experiments or improvisations. The first junta of civilians collapsed because of their inability and political incompetence. The present Christian Democrat team--obviously weak, inept and sectarian--is absolutely incapable of confronting the present crisis and will collapse soon. This means a lamentable loss of valuable time that could be used well by a serious, responsible and efficient government. The military members who have been in both government juntas have not been consistent with the political situation of the country. Therefore, it is necessary for the armed forces to change its representation, making it more functional and appropriate to the present circumstances.

Even if the objectives of the proclamation were considered obligatory, it is ridiculous to consider the organic formation of the junta, unconstitutional in itself, obligatory. If it were necessary to maintain unity of command and operation during the provisional period, the mandate should be placed in a civilian or military president, in the supreme interest of the people and the nation.

Given the seriousness of the situation, the POP feels it is necessary to call for a government of national unity which would include the most representative and capable elements of El Salvador. It is impossible to continue enshrining incompetence as a form of government. The country needs its best sons who must be invited unselfishly and without sectarian interests. It is a big mistake to believe that one single organization is capable of resolving our serious situation. It is also a mistake to pack the government with personal friends, technocrats who are only concerned with the budget or unknown independents who do not represent anything or anyone. This government of national unity must first confront the political problem which is destroying us with its derivatives of violence, without neglecting the rational process of change. If it could achieve national pacification through its broad base and credibility, it could bring the future of the fatherland, the consolidation of democracy and the triumph of the Salvadoran people to an honest election.

The POP reiterates its defense of the Political Constitution. It supports the opinion of respected jurists who have defended the Constitution against the threat of an irresponsible repeal. We are against the imposition of an unadvised pseudoconstitutional statute because, in addition to being one more insult to our fatherland and an abuse of the laws that sustain it, it would be one more factor of political violence and social deterioration.

Our Constitution must remain in effect and the provisional government must end. Legislation must be done honestly and, above all, a constitutional assembly must be convoked so that it and only it represents the sovereign people who can determine their own future and their own destiny.

The POP is ready to contribute patriotically to a government of national unity, to contribute--through its representatives--all its effort and ability to benefit our people and our beloved fatherland, El Salvador.

[Signed] Rene Benjamin Segovia, secretary general, POP
Card No. 1-1-202804

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EL SALVADOR

AGRICULTURE MINISTER DISCUSSES AGRARIAN REFORM

San Salvador LA PRENSA GRAFICA in Spanish 14 Dec 79 p 103

[Speech by Agriculture and Livestock Minister Enrique Alvarez Cordoba on the Radio and Television Network on 11 December 1979]

[Text] Good evening, Salvadorans. Agrarian Reform is the most important and far-reaching step to change those structures that have allowed and institutionalized social injustice in our country. This is not the only change that this country needs, but it is indispensable to begin a program of agrarian reform to root out injustice in El Salvador.

The government's Revolutionary Junta is firmly decided on carrying out this reform, as is the cabinet, the armed forces, and of course the Salvadoran people, who for many years through all their grass-roots organizations have asserted themselves, insisting that this program of reform be started.

Thus it is the decision of all Salvadorans and not a minister's whim, as has frequently been said. What is really clear is that your agriculture and livestock minister believes this is the greatest proof the present government and the armed forces can give: to reveal if they are going to be on the side of the people or not.

That a program of agrarian reform will be carried out, that this program will be started, should not surprise anyone. What should surprise all of us Salvadorans is that this program was not started earlier. To speak of agrarian reform 10 years ago meant jail or exile. Right now all the political parties have it in their platform, and we are still not including the grass-roots groups and organizations, who are insisting that a program of agrarian reform must be carried out. All we Salvadorans are aware, I think, of the reasons for starting an agrarian reform program. Nevertheless it is worth the trouble to cite some simple figures, which are enormously painful. But first I want to emphasize the importance of agriculture and livestock in El Salvador. The wealth of the Salvadoran people is rooted in the countryside; everything that El Salvador produces comes from the countryside, and this wealth, this production, is brought forth chiefly by the Salvadoran peasants. Thus it is a

contradiction that those who are the producers, who feed us, who contribute significantly to creating El Salvador's wealth--I repeat, it is a contradiction--that they are the ones who suffer most from the injustices existing in our country.

I was saying that the situation of the Salvadoran peasant is well known, but it is worthwhile to keep these figures in mind because they are extremely shocking. I would like to ask all Salvadorans the following:

Do we believe that any Salvadoran thinks it right that 67 out of every 100 peasant women give birth to their babies without expert help? Is there any Salvadoran who thinks it right that 60 out of every 1,000 children born in the countryside die? Is there any Salvadoran who thinks it right that 73 out of every 100 children are malnourished? Is there any Salvadoran who thinks it right that barely 37 percent of peasant families have access to sources of water? Is there any Salvadoran who thinks it right that half the rural population is illiterate? Is there any Salvadoran who thinks it right that more than 250,000 families are living in housing that consists of only one room, when we know there is an average of between five and six persons in a family?

The answer to these questions is a resounding NO.

On 15 October the military youth decided to begin a program of Agrarian reform to change, as the proclamation states, the structures that have caused the great injustices that prevail in the Salvadoran countryside.

This was, and must be interpreted as a way out, an answer to popular demands, made through organizations, political parties, unions and the progressive wing of our church. Thus the Junta has promised to carry out this decision made on 15 October, and all of us who form the present government are pledged to fulfill this proclamation. But what must we Salvadorans understand is meant by agrarian reform? Among all the factors considered in an agrarian reform the most important, from all viewpoints, is ownership of the land, a circumstance that is no unjust--as our entire television audience will be able to see--we believe it with difficulty, or rather it is painful for us to believe.

I will explain this situation by presenting a picture to you, so that our friends in the television audience may have a better overall view.

In El Salvador there are about 280,000 farms, which comprise a total of more than 2 million manzanas. But let us look at two extremes. At one extreme we have 267,000 properties of up to 70 manzanas each, which is 99 percent of the total, covering barely 51 percent of the total surface. At the other extreme we have a minority of less than 2,000 landowners who have holdings of about 145 manzanas or more for a total of 800,000 manzanas, which means nearly 40 percent of the land is owned by less than 1 percent of the landowners. Seven-tenths of one percent of the landowners have 40 percent of the land. If we add to this that the land owned by this 1 percent minority of landowners

is the best quality land, the land where coffee, cotton, and sugar cane, the most profitable products, are grown, and that at the other extreme we have more than 265,000 landowners who have the least fertile lands, the lands where paradoxically is produced the food we all consume daily, then it is the small farmer who is feeding our people.

Who is agrarian reform in El Salvador going to help? Decidedly and above all, agrarian reform will aid the man in the countryside, the Salvadoran peasant. But he will not be the only one to see himself helped by an agrarian reform program. This program also will aid the merchant and the manufacturer. The day that there is permanent work in our countryside, the day that all workers in the countryside, specifically the agricultural wage earners, have well-paid work all year long, on that day the country's domestic market will become a true market and merchants and national industry will prosper. Therefore the agrarian reform program will assist and will tend to give preference to all Salvadorans. The agrarian reform program, as we were saying, is going to be made with and for the peasants. For this reason from the first day we accepted responsibility in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock we made it clear we were going to support energetically peasant organization, and we were going to encourage this organization to continue in all forms, including cooperatives, unions, community associations and any other form on which the peasant himself decides.

It may seem incredible that in 1979 there is still a debate going on over the rights of 60 percent of the Salvadoran population, which means the peasants have to organize themselves. This government will establish such a measure; it will clearly allow peasant unionization in a few days.

We believe that only by having an organized peasantry, one that is prepared and capable, will it be possible to successfully put into effect the agrarian reform program and to really help those who the program is attempting to help, the Salvadoran peasants above all. The program, as its name indicates, will be carried out in stages. But this program has already been started by the present government. How has it been started? By decreeing Law No 43, which prohibits transfers and mortgages on rural landholdings to preserve economic and productive unity; that is, we must increase production and not limit it. The other objective is to avoid dividing this land that we value so highly in an irrational way, in a way that may stop or delay the agrarian reform program. The third basic goal is to avoid fraud, the mockery that at other times was made of laws having the same objective.

We all know that recently some persons have been trying to oppose, to mock this executive order. Right now this decree includes three levels of landowners: the small landowner on whom it places no restrictions up to 70 manzanas and who is, in fact, the one the government helps in every way possible; second the moderate landowner, who the government allows but under regulation; and lastly there is the third level, landowners with 145 manzanas and above, who are the only ones temporarily affected by this decree. In other words, the third group consists of those 2,000 landowners who we have

previously described in our picture. Thus this Decree blocks only property owned by those who have more than a total of 145 manzanas: 2,000 landowners. But let us see how many landowners would be affected by territory. I would like to present a few more examples to those who are starting to say that this law will end private property, that this law is committing a crime against all rights possessed by the farmer. In Ahuachapan territory only 219 landowners are affected, in Cuscatlan only 64, in La Libertad 278, and in Cabanas 57.

As all the Salvadoran people can see, particularly the small and moderate farmer, this law does not harm them in any way. It only limits temporarily the rights of landowners with more than 145 manzanas until the Agrarian Reform Law is approved.

Today the Junta has also established another provision that I believe is important for all farmers to know, that is, all those who work in the countryside, who sow--as we have been saying--our wealth. We have said, and so has the government, that one of the short-term goals is to fight inflation selectively so that it does not hit so hard at low-income families, as it has been doing until now. One way of accomplishing this is to control the prices of basic food products, but the government has also said it does not want to achieve inflation control at the expense of the producers of our wealth. As we have already said, the producer of our food is the grower of kidney beans, rice, milk and corn, basically the small farmer. Thus the government has established a measure which today was approved by the government's Revolutionary Junta. This law has two basic aims. The first is to extend all leases, that is all rent contracts in force or expired, for all those who at this time are sowing areas of a tarea of corn up to many manzanas of cotton; the contracts they had for renting land are automatically extended by law. The second aspect is to base the fixing of rent scales on different criteria from the previous ones by establishing rents according to type of soil, and moreover according to the products grown, depending on their profitability. Thus rent scales are being established, but this government believes that those who are running risks, who are putting in big investments, must receive these profits, and not the farmer who does not work his lands and who, without a large risk or with hardly any risk, is collecting rents from land. Therefore rent scales have been reduced to the following figures, according to the type of soil and equally for all products grown; the maximum rent scales are: 200.00, 150.00, 100.00, 50.00 and 25.00 colons. This, I repeat, will be a great help to the Salvadoran grower, since we all know--and the ministry is aware--that there are places such as Zapotitan where farmers who were engaged in producing green vegetables and other kinds of garden crops were paying more than 1,000.00 colons per manzana a year.

Thus this measure aids all those who sow and cultivate the land as regards rents, and that includes the small, moderate and large farmers.

I was saying that the land regulation decree is temporary and that it will be in force until the Agrarian Reform Law takes effect. The ministry will soon introduce a project based on this law, and at this time I would like to present a few ideas to dissipate the uncertainty that some have been spreading around. I will try to summarize this law and some of its basic points, which are the following: it will be applied nationally and will affect the whole country; the law will be applied in all Salvadoran territory, there will be no exceptions according to products grown. I was saying at the beginning that everyone is talking about agrarian reform, and some believe that it must be made by excluding or leaving out land where coffee, cotton and sugar cane are grown. The truth is that creating an agrarian reform of this kind would be a mockery because specifically we would be supressing that numerous sector whom we have said the state is going to help and we would be letting alone the big land barons. And we must state clearly that the latter is the one who will really be affected by an agrarian reform program, for the benefit of the rest of the population. On the other hand, the agrarian reform that we are witnessing does not mean giving a piece of land to every peasant; that is not the answer to our problem. Agrarian reform, as we see it, means to preserve economic and productive unity, but in such a way that the profits of this production are distributed among those who work for it. This is the important idea that we want to mention: that we are not going to give, as is being said, a piece of land to every peasant, because that way we would only be institutionalizing poverty. No, what we will do is change that land so that its profits go directly to those who make it productive, in other words, the large majority of the peasants.

In these times that we are living through, which are historic ones for our country, people have recently been saying very obstinately that what this country needs is peace and tranquillity, that there should be no violence. Personally I am not in favor of violence. I am very much against it, but I am against all types of violence, and the truth is that this country has undergone and the vast majority of its people has lived in a system of violence. Thus we oppose all kinds of violence. Moreover, we believe that before speaking of peace, before speaking of tranquillity, we must talk about injustice. We cannot speak of peace and tranquillity while injustice prevails in the Salvadoran countryside, and in many other sectors of our population.

One also speaks of the silent majority. We think that the only silent majority that has existed in El Salvador has been the peasant specifically, who for centuries has kept quiet. But we see at this time there is hope that the present government will change the conditions in which the Salvadoran peasant has lived for so long. For this reason we believe that the peasant has ceased to be silent and will defend his rights, which were denied for so many years. This means he will defend the agrarian reform program that the present government has started.

Good night, and thank you.

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CSO: 3010

EL SALVADOR

BANK ASSOCIATION DISCUSSES FINANCIAL REFORMS

San Salvador LA PRENSA GRAFICA in Spanish 25 Jan 80 p 27

[Text] The Public Should Know About the Financial System Reform Plan I. On 31 December 1979, the Christian Democratic Party presented a document to the Armed Forces which it called "Government Platform," proposal for integration of a new government and which demanded "the nationalization of the national financial system," in the economic and social sector.

Associating themselves with the Government Revolutionary Junta, Dr Jose Antonio Morales Ehrlich and Hector Dad Hirezi, shortly after their declaration, in messages broadcast by radio and television, reaffirmed the position of the Christian Democratic Party, of which they are members. They stressed the urgent need for nationalization of the national financial system, with a view to the government's eliminating private enterprise, "for which it would prescribe the rules of the game," and attaining the peace needed by the country to continue its progress.

II. In the same "Government Platform," the Christian Democratic Party also requested abolition of the Political Constitution and the issuance of a Constitutional Statute so that "the structural changes" which the party in power is seeking can be brought about with full and absolute freedom.

III. On 11 January 1980, Dr Morales Ehrlich told the national press that "anxiety must be eliminated from the ambience as a matter of urgency," as the idea that El Salvador is on the verge of civil war still persists; and, were this to happen, we would all be hurt and the whole country would be ruined." On that occasion, the head of the Christian Democratic Party reaffirmed that the republic would be attained through the nationalization of the banking sector and foreign trade and the implementation of a profound agrarian reform.

IV. Similar demands and statements have increased the malaise, the climate of uneasiness and the ambience of tension being experienced by the people, instead of finding the path that could lead the nation to the attainment of the peace and security we all need to enable us to engage in productive labor which will permit the development of the Salvadoran family.

V. It was the practice of previous governments to promulgate laws without consultation, despite the serious consequences which, for lack of knowledge about the legal aspects of subject legislated, such laws entailed for the country. The statement that the Government Revolutionary Junta has made it possible for "all of us to be the government" and that it will manage its administration through ideological pluralism and the participation of all sectors in the solution of national problems gave citizens the confidence to believe that the new rulers would maintain a regime of public opinion, in which all the sectors involved would have the opportunity to express their opinions and thoughts to contribute to the approval of laws which would be the reflection of national reality.

VI. The Salvadoran Banking Association, made up of the private national banks, is not opposed to the structural changes the country needs in the economic, political and social sectors. However, it believes that the legal instruments permitting such changes should be known, studied and analyzed by the affected sectors, because of the consequences for and impact on the country's economy which could directly affect all Salvadorans.

VII. Since the announcement concerning nationalization of the Financial System, made up of Banks, Savings and Loan Associations and Insurance Companies has created a deep malaise among depositors, savers and employees in the sector, it is worthwhile and of vital importance that the Financial System Reform plan, to which the Government Revolutionary Junta has made reference, be made known to the public so that its scope can be evaluated and a determination made as to whether the public's present doubts about the situation in which their bank accounts, savings deposits, insurance payments and loans to workers by the System have any basis in fact.

VIII. For its part, the Salvadoran Banking Association reaffirms its readiness to participate in the study and analysis of any Financial System Reform plan so that the legal instrument issued within the framework of Constitutional Principles will be of benefit to the republic, in its function of promoting the national progress and economy of the country, which is passing through a dangerous structural crisis.

Salvadoran Banking Association

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CSO: 3010

MEXICO

GAS SALES TO U.S. ALL SET TO BEGIN

Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 12 Jan 80 p 7

[Article by Roberto Rodriguez: "Everything Ready for Shipment for 300 Million Cubic Feet of Gas Per Day to the United States"]

[Text] Coatzacoalcos, Vert., 11 January. All facilities are ready to enable PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum] within less than 4 days to start shipping natural gas to the United States.

As of 15 January "we have planned the shipment of 300 million cubic feet per day to the government of the United States." "In this way," said Engineer Genaro Andrew Gonzalez, company manager in charge of hydrocarbons exploitation and distribution in the southern part of the republic, "we are carrying out our part of the commitment undertaken to this neighboring country to the north."

In the course of a meeting of business operators in the public and private sectors, organized by the office of the city council president, featuring a briefing on the development of the agency with respect to social and economic measures, Andrew Gonzalez announced that the gas pipeline export capacity varies between 500 and 800 million [cubic feet] of natural gas everyday.

He hinted that, since PEMEX announced that the price of this natural resource, which is very useful to homes and companies in the United States, is 3.625 [pesos] per 1,000 cubic feet and if "we are going to ship 300 million [cubic feet] of this fuel, we can calculate daily sales amounting to 23 million pesos."

The official stated that natural gas "transportation" tests have already been worked out; the results are positive and officials are sure that there will be no problems regarding the shipment of this resource to the storage tanks in the border cities of the United States.

Starting Point at Cactus

The completion of the gas pipeline and the ultimate shipment of this resource are the result of a tremendous effort by engineers, workers, and

government officials deriving from an administration policy designed to protect hydrocarbons, according to Engineer Andrew Gonzalez; on the other hand he explained that "the starting point" is at Cactus (a petrochemical complex which is located near Reforma, Chiapas) and the gas will be shipped from there to Monterrey.

He pointed out that the gas pipeline has a natural gas shipping capacity of 800 million cubic feet, of which the United States will import 300 millions, starting next Tuesday, in January.

The manager of the southern zone of PEMEX--which includes Oaxaca, Tabasco, Chiapas, Veracruz, and Campeche--talked about the importance and the degree of development of PEMEX and its degree of influence in Coatzacoalcos.

He indicated that the output comes to 1,538,892,000 barrels per day, "constituting 89.4 percent of the total national output."

He revealed that 131 teams are now involved in the drilling phase and they include 95 development wells, 34 exploratory wells, and 2 relief wells. Besides, 53 teams and groups are studying new areas that may contain hydrocarbons.

The PEMEX official also explained that, in order to carry out the programs drawn up so far, the agency has a total of 41,200 workers assigned to the southern zone, with 19,280 permanent personnel and 21,920 temporary personnel. "That is independently of the manpower hired by the construction companies that are doing the construction work as such."

The most outstanding among all of the infrastructure facilities is the trunk pipeline of the natural gas system, a project whose size and characteristics distinguish it from the others. He noted in this connection that "natural gas plays an important role as raw material and fuel in the country's social-economic development."

New Development Centers

This gas pipeline (the trunk line of the national system), which starts in the southern zone and ends in San Fernando, N. L. [Nuevo Leon], according to Andrew, combines the natural gas supplies for all industrial cities throughout the land and promotes the creation of new development centers along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.

He then disclosed the direct and indirect participation of PEMEX and the influence it exerts as a technical, industrial, commercial, and social-economic factor in the metropolitan growth area along the Coatzacoalcos River.

He said that the "La Cangrejera" Petrochemical Complex is now under construction; it is considered the biggest in Latin America. He added

that it will have 20 processing plants, totally integrated with auxiliary service installations, such as storage tanks, steam generating units, electric power, and water supply; there will also be workshop buildings, warehouses, and the necessary administrative support facilities.

Before completing his lecture and briefing--in which he detailed the achievements of the most important refineries in the region--Andrew Gonzalez noted that "we believe that the participation of PEMEX will be a factor generating industrial activities and jobs since it is a promoter of multiple enterprises which use its products or which supply a wide range of capital goods required by the petroleum industry." PEMEX is also a factor in economic integration through the rather large population centers, generating an increase in the demand for goods and services.

Addressing manufacturers, private-industry entrepreneurs, and businessmen, the PEMEX representative agreed that there is pollution in Minatitlan, Coatzacoalcos, and other parts of the south and that the agency is fully aware of that and will certainly be the first to be concerned with solving this problem to the extent of its capabilities and budget. There is a budget allocation of 150 millions for environmental protection.

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MEXICO

PEMEX FOREIGN DEBT REACHES 6.5 BILLION PESOS

Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 15 Jan 80 p 8

[Text] The Mexican Petroleum Enterprise yesterday signed up for a loan of \$500 million or 11.5 billion pesos with a Japanese banking consortium, headed by the Industrial Bank of Japan. This loan means that the PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum] foreign debt now comes to \$6.5 billion.

The loan was signed yesterday morning in Tokyo, according to information supplied by PEMEX.

Until 2 days ago, the total debt came to 6 billion on which the company must pay 20 billion pesos in interest, according to Rodolfo Dominguez Calzada, PEMEX general coordinator.

The new loan is to be used to finance a portion of the investments of the Mexican Petroleum Enterprise and was taken out at an annual interest rate of 8 percent, to be paid within 10 years.

The interest payments will also go up by 92 million pesos; this, on top of the 20 billion pesos means just about nothing in the opinion of Dominguez Calzada because PEMEX revenues in just one year came to \$10 billion and the prior debt could be paid off in 8 months, if it were absolutely necessary.

The interest rate granted here on this new loan was considered exceptional since the interest rate fixed by London, with daily variations, is about 14 percent.

PEMEX explained that this involves a straight credit and this, furthermore, implies neither commissions, nor any additional expenses; it is certainly within PEMEX' ability to pay according to the pertinent estimates--that is to say, the revenue figures mentioned--and its good credit rating, recognized internationally over the past 40 years of punctual payment on financial commitments.

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DIAZ DISCUSSES CURRENT PEMEX SITUATION

Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 12 Jan 80 p 7

[Article by Sara Lovera: "Comments on Waste, Gasoline Black Market Criticisms, Progress"]

[Text] Petroleum is not to be wasted. Gasoline black market along northern border. Texan criticism of Ixtoc unfair. Mexico will never join speculative market. Noteworthy progress in petrochemistry. Debt no source of worry--two engineers.

Mexico must use petroleum for development; this is not a resource to be wasted, Jorge Diaz Serrano said yesterday; he criticized those who are involved in the speculative petroleum market because he believes that they are playing with fire.

Engineer Diaz Serrano also stated, in talking to a group of reporters, that there is a gasoline shortage in the northern part of the country at this time; this is due to distribution problems and transportation shortages; but he indicated that there is also domestic and foreign gasoline smuggling going on. It has been possible to discover that fuel is being brought to the other side of the border in 200-liter drums, but also in complete tank trucks. Diaz Serrano pledged to solve this problem as quickly as possible.

As for the new threat in the Texan press, regarding the effects of Ixtoc, the official pointed out that a well that runs out of control must not be used as a pretext for applying pressure on anybody, especially not against Mexico since the latter is currently stepping up its exploitation of crude which is why he considers this criticism unfair because it is precisely in the United States, in Louisiana, that they have had a well running out of control since 1977.

The official's briefing, given to about 50 reporters, originally was supposed to have been informal but assumed importance when Diaz Serrano noted that petroleum must be "an instrument for development and must not be wasted"; he agreed that Mexico is in the midst of a tremendous growth

phase and that petroleum is behind the growth of industry--which, by the way, benefits from the low petroleum prices; this, he said, constitutes a gigantic subsidy; these are things which one must not forget.

Shortage Problem

Diaz Serrano admitted that gasoline shortages have cropped up in some of the northern states of Mexico; this is due to smuggling and excessive fuel consumption, both in Mexico and in the United States, along the border, primarily as a result of the difference in prices which makes Mexican gasoline attractive on the markets along the border in the United States.

Among the measures that are being taken to solve this problem as quickly as possible, it has been suggested that one might increase prices on extra gasoline shipped to that area; according to Engineer Ignacio de Leon, the company's business manager, Mexico daily produces 250,000 barrels of extra gasoline of which 70 percent are earmarked for and consumed in the northern part of the country.

The shortage also got worse because truckers refused to work during the vacation season when the highways are jammed with tourists.

Speculation

As far as the phenomenon of petroleum price speculation is concerned in the United States, Dias Serrano said that this speculation takes place within the United States domestic market; nevertheless, he criticized those who get into the speculative market which Mexico will never join; he said that the price of \$32 per barrel, in long-term contracts, is a good price for Mexican petroleum.

He said that the principal buyers of petroleum at speculative prices are Holland, through the port of Rotterdam, and Japan. In the case of the former, approximately 15 percent of the petroleum comes from that market and in the case of the latter, the figure is 3 percent.

Development

In response to a specific question as to Mexico's growth possibilities, the official said that Mexico is entering a real phase of industrial development, through the growth of the steel industry, with the production of heavy machinery. This means more electric power, a complete revision of the railroad system, and the start of important projects, such as the port of Las Truchas; but he noted that petroleum is always behind all of this development.

He recalled that the petroleum industry has made great strides, becoming one of the country's strongest fiscal supports; during 1980, it will earn 160 billion pesos in taxes for the treasury.

Because they are so low, fuel prices furthermore represent a gigantic subsidy for industrial development. Progress has also been made in the petrochemical industry since Mexico will soon have the world's three biggest plants for the production of liquids.

The Debt

Concerning the PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum] debt, company officials who came with Engineer Diaz Serrano, including Engineer Antonio Diaz Lastra and Jose Dominguez Calzada, pointed out that the debt currently comes to \$6 billion; but they recalled that PEMEX earnings in 1979 came to \$10 billion, which is why there is no reason to worry about the debt.

This year, interest payments will come to a little less than \$1 billion--20 billion pesos--and if Mexico wanted to pay the debt off, this could be done in just 8 months, exclusively with company funds.

The Ixtoc Affair

It was recalled during the breakfast that the Ixtoc affair sprang up in Texas only 48 hours earlier. A telegram pointed out that Mexico should control the well during the next 8 weeks, otherwise "the black tide will again invade the coast of the United States." "Is this a form of pressure?" Diaz Serrano was asked.

The official said rather sharply in this respect that a well running out of control should not be a pretext for pressure. Engineer Jose Chavarria, deputy operations manager, said that the well might possibly be gotten under control this month and that operations conducted so far could be considered successful.

He noted that the cost of Ixtoc so far has been 2 billion pesos and that the second relief well is about to be completed; the problem could definitely be resolved through it. In conclusion he assured his audience that the polluting effects have been reduced to a minimum.

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PEMEX: NO SUDDEN CHANGE IN PRODUCTION FORESEEN

Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 15 Jan 80 p 8

[Article by Sara Lovera: "Real Hydrocarbon Reserves Yet To Be Determined"]

[Text] The discovery of a new oil field in the Chiapas-Tabasco zone with reserves of 1.5 billion barrels was disclosed yesterday by PEMEX [Mexican Petroleum] General Manager Jorge Diaz Serrano who pointed out that the company is in the midst of the discovery stage.

The new complex, called Iris-Giraldas, is a part of the 25 producing fields in the southeast zone from which 60 percent of the nation's output is currently obtained.

In starting the 35th meeting of the Latin American Petroleum Industry Mutual Aid Association yesterday morning, the official assured his audience that the production level will not be changed any time soon and that one cannot expect a sudden change, although he believed that it is very important to step up exploratory operations in Latin America in order to locate reserves, to determine their volume, and to certify them as an indispensable foundation of security and certainty regarding the future development of the nations involved.

In Mexico--he said--we must still determine the full extent of the real hydrocarbon reserve because, in spite of the fact that 90 percent of the country's surface is made up of sedimentary basins, we have so far explored only a little more than 10 percent so that we must double our prospecting activities.

Looking at Latin America, he noted that circumstances are as favorable as in Mexico, since the region's total surface contains 20 percent of the world's sedimentary basins; there is therefore a good probability of petroleum being found underground or on the continental shelf. Diaz Serrano stressed the fact that prospecting is a primary activity for any petroleum production company. It would not be wise and nobody would even think of going into subsoil hydrocarbon extraction and gradually increasing the daily barrel output without first having figures on proven, probable, and

potential reserves which would guarantee the survival of the industry and its viability over a reasonable number of years.

The reserves in the new deposits will be included in those that were certified by the Mexican Petroleum Industry as of 31 December 1979 which is why we are only waiting for the last scientific report before the new figure on proven reserves will be released.

Iris

The Iris-Giraldas Complex, in the Chiapas-Tabasco zone, is a part of the southeastern region, covering 7,000 square kilometers, so far containing 25 fields.

Discoveries in this area and serious prospecting and exploitation activities date back to about 7 years, although prospecting was also started in other zones with very considerable results, some of them quite unsuspected, he noted.

He explained to the audience participating in the seminar--which will last for the entire week and which is designed to exchange scientific information on new geological concepts in petroleum prospecting--that prospecting in Mexico is oriented toward the total evaluation of Mexican reserves for the purpose of getting firm data facilitating total planning for the industry.

In his remarks, covering 8 sheets of notes, the PEMEX manager recalled that, as a result of studies and the resumption of prospecting over the past 3 years, it was possible to locate a big oil and gas production complex in the Gulf of Campeche, where, he repeated, a petroleum region of maximum worldwide importance has been spotted.

In the north of the republic, in the states of Coahuila and Nuevo Leon, engineers were able to locate the Mesozoic Gulf of Sabinas, with a geological province of 40,000 [square] kilometers. These are gas fields which currently have an average output of 10 million cubic feet per day and per well.

Work in the northern zone of Veracruz is also being pushed; here the sub-soil contains one of the biggest accumulations of fossil fuel. Approximately 16,000 wells are being drilled here in the Chicantepec Basin which will soon be in a stage of full development; the yield is relatively modest but operations are singularly easy here.

Latin America

Regarding the possibility that the Latin American region might contain hydrocarbons, Diaz Serrano pointed out that it must be admitted that so far very little has been done in the matter of prospecting, among other

things because the countries of the Southern Horn did not always have the proper financial resources for these activities and besides there has been a shortage of qualified technical personnel.

He expressed the belief that the worldwide energy plan, proposed by the president of Mexico at the UN, implies the rationalization of petroleum use, as well as normal resources exploitation, because we must continue to have petroleum available; but that must not lead to the delapidation nor exhaustion of this resource underground--hence the importance of stepping up prospecting.

Speaking in the name of the organization, Arturo del Castillo stressed the importance of the meeting since petroleum resources must be used for a transition phase which must not be violent. He expressed the hope that energy prices will continue to go up and warned that there is one fact which must be analyzed seriously, one unquestionable fact which means that those countries, which do not have energy resources for their development, could fail to grow or could seriously threaten their growth.

Diaz Serrano Speaks

The PEMEX official, who was interviewed at the end of the ceremony, said that Mexico has not decided to stop the shipments of crude to the United States, in spite of the fact that Mexico is worried that some customer might break out of Mexico's rigid nonspeculation scheme although as a matter of fact "we are not dealing with the United States as such but rather with 16 clients whom we selected among enterprises and who are efficient and strong."

As far as the fuel distribution problem in Mexico is concerned, he pointed out that changes are necessary in the transportation infrastructure so as to solve present problems and prevent future ones from arising.

More pipes will be produced for gas, gasoline, and petroleum product pipelines and well as crude pipelines. This will prevent the overcrowding of highways, railroads, and ports because right now much of the crude from the south is being transported by ship to the refineries in the north; work is going forward on laying the pipelines which will handle much of this transport operation, thus relieving the burden on tank trucks as well as the railroads and the highways.

Every day, between 15 and 16 kilometers of pipelines of varying diameters are being installed; this is not a specific program or a specific investment but it is instead a part of the routine, previously budgeted operations.

Diaz Serrano finally stressed that, from the production viewpoint, no abrupt changes are expected; he noted that the PEMEX program is well balanced, reaching a level of 2.25 million barrels per day; the Mexican federal government will indicate which way the industry is to go but he emphasized that this is not the sort of situation in which one can move abruptly.

MEXICO

AD INVITES PARTICIPANTS IN TRADE MISSION TO EAST EUROPE

Mexico City EL DIA in Spanish 12 Jan 80 p 9

[Advertisement]

[Text] Trade mission to socialist countries. In order to promote our exports to the socialist countries, the Mexican Foreign Trade Institute is issuing invitations to participate in the trade mission which will be held between 14 and 29 March 1980, to the following countries.

Poland, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Among the products in which most interest was expressed and which are included in trade agreements on the government level, signed between Mexico and the countries to be visited, we have the following:

Textiles: cotton thread, raw cotton fabrics, knitwear. Ready-made clothing: light tweed and corduroy jeans. Synthetic fibers. Cotton. Leather articles. Shoes. Cocoa: bulk or instant. Food products: canned tropical fruits, vegetables, fish, and concentrated fruit juices. Spices. Citrus fruit. Bee honey. Certified seeds. Essential oils. Hard fibers. Chemical and pharmaceutical products. Nonferrous metals. Fluorite. Lead oxide. Sulfur. Handicrafts articles. Jewelry.

In connection with the Leipzig International Spring Fair, in the GDR, from 9 to 15 March, your company will also have an opportunity to participate in both events, achieving greater promotion for your products, and getting to know new developed technologies.

Mexican exporters who wish to participate must register prior to 30 January at the institute's fair and trade mission coordination office, 30 Alfonso Reyes, 8th floor, Phone: 286-10-23, or contact the regional agencies of the IMCE [Mexican Foreign Trade Institute] in Leon, Gto.; Monterrey, N.L.; and Guadalajara, Jal., where further information may be obtained.

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